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SUMMARY
The objective of the proposed research is to quantify the limits of overstressed
and aging circuit breakers in terms of probability of failure and to provide guidelines to
determine network reconfigurations, generator commitment, and economic dispatch
strategies that account for these limits. These temporary power system operating
strategies address circuit breaker adequacy issues, and overstressed breakers can be
operated longer and more reliably until they are replaced with adequate equipment.
The expansion of electric networks with new power sources (nuclear plants, dis-
tributed generation) results in increased short-circuit (fault) currents levels. A num-
ber of circuit breakers do not have sufficient ratings to interrupt these increased faults
currents. These breakers are said to be overstressed (underrated, inadequate). Be-
cause of their insufficient ratings, overstressed breakers are subject to increased failure
probabilities. Extensive common-mode outages caused by circuit breaker failures re-
duce the reliability of power systems. To avoid outages and system unreliability,
overstressed breakers must eventually be replaced.
The replacement of overstressed breakers cannot be completed in a short time be-
cause of budgetary limits, capital improvement schedules, and manufacturer-imposed
constraints. Meanwhile, to preserve the ability of old and overstressed breakers to
safely interrupt faults, short-circuit currents must be kept within the limits imposed
by the ratings and the age of these breakers, using the substation reconfiguration and
generator commitment strategies described in this study.
The immediate benefit of the above-mentioned operating strategies is a reduction
of the failure probability of overstressed breakers obtained by avoiding the interruption
of currents in excess of breaker ratings. Other benefits include (i) more reliable
xv
network operation, (ii) restored operating margins with respect to existing equipment,
and (iii) prioritized equipment upgrades that enable improvements in power systems
planning.
The proposed work is illustrated using a three-phase, breaker-oriented 24-substation
test system that extends the existing IEEE Reliability Test System.
xvi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1 Human Vulnerability to Power Outages
Electricity supports the core needs of modern civilization. Lighting, health equipment,
and information technology are just a few examples of electricity-powered systems
that the vast majority of people rely on. The demand for a reliable energy supply
has significantly increased with population growth, business expansions, and the fact
that, in developed countries, the availability of electricity is taken for granted [1].
With such a dependency on electricity (and with the tendency to forget how it is
generated and transmitted), any disruption in the power supply can have tremendous
consequences, such as lost business revenues, paralyzed cities, or the interruption of
critical and vital processes. The North-American blackout of August 2003 and outages
across Europe during subsequent months reminded the world of its vulnerability to
power outages. Even if companies and government agencies have prepared themselves
for emergencies related to power outages [2, 3], the cost of an outage to one of the
largest businesses may exceed millions of dollars per hour of downtime [4].
1.2 Power Systems Equipment Reliability Concerns
One very common cause of power interruptions originates from malfunctioning pro-
tective equipment that fails to interrupt and isolate faults. These failures significantly
contribute to system unreliability. Considering recent events and trends in power sys-
tems operation, there are two causes that may lead to an increased number of system
failures: equipment adequacy and equipment aging.
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1.2.1 Generation Capacity Growth, Increased Fault Currents, and Cir-
cuit Breaker Adequacy
A leading cause of increased system failures is the operation of equipment beyond its
design limits. Lines and switchgear are designed to carry or interrupt given currents
that are determined by the expected power transfers at the time of construction.
As a result of population growth and technological progress, the demand and
generation of electric power have dramatically increased between the last third of the
20th century and the first decade of the 21th century. On one hand, load currents and
short-circuit currents have increased following this trend; on the other hand, many
circuit breakers currently in service were installed in the late 1960s and were not
upgraded to support these increased short-circuit (or fault) currents.
Although large coal and nuclear power plants contribute to most of the generation
capacity, distributed generation is increasingly contributing to the expansion of power
grids worldwide. Distributed generation includes renewable energy sources, cogener-
ation plants, and other independently-owned, small-scale generators that produce
electricity using energy sources available locally. Distributed generation is advocated
for its benefits in terms of reduced transmission congestion, system voltage stability,
energy efficiency, and improved pollution levels [5, 6]. Unfortunately, the expansion
of generation capacity has caused electric networks to be operated beyond their de-
sign transmission capacity. Moreover, distributed generation has become a leading
cause of locally increased fault current levels [7, 8]. Increased fault currents pose a
problem with circuit breaker ratings and unforeseen increases in the ground potential
during short circuits. The resulting step-and-touch voltages may exceed safe levels
for humans and other animals.
Overall, the expansion of power grids in developed countries has unintentionally
brought electric utilities and large industrial consumers to a situation where circuit
breakers may become underrated. Under certain fault conditions, the current exceeds
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the rating or interrupting capability of some breakers. This situation is referred to as
circuit breaker inadequacy (Table 1).
Table 1: Synthetic example of the circuit breaker adequacy issue.
Year y (Initial Condition) Year y + 20
Highest fault current 25 kA 45 kA
Breaker rating 40 kA, new condition 40 kA less wear and tear
Is rating adequate? Yes No
The problem of circuit breaker inadequacy is not recent and occurs in transmis-
sion and distribution systems of various voltage levels [9, 10]. Although it is possible
to retrofit certain breakers to increase their interrupting capability [11], the complex-
ity and limited benefits of retrofitting modern equipment may justify replacing the
equipment in the long term.
Circuit breakers are rated to interrupt fault currents up to a certain magnitude.
Just as overloading a motor shortens its life, attempting to interrupt faults with
a breaker not sufficiently rated increases its probability of failure. Circuit breaker
failures may cause undesired, widespread outages as a result of the operation of
backup protection schemes.
1.2.2 Reliability Issues with Aging Equipment
In developed (North-American and European) countries, the other leading cause of
increased grid failures is the age of an infrastructure that was built decades ago for the
most part. Circuit breakers are an integral part of this infrastructure. The age and
weaknesses of such power systems are apparent, especially when it comes to powering
sophisticated equipment that requires highly reliable supplies. The May 2006 issue
of IEEE Power & Energy Magazine was titled “The Graying Power System” and was
entirely devoted to the state and aging problems of electric grids.
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Although investments tend to be cyclic, no massive improvements to the U.S.
power systems infrastructure have been made since the late 1960s [12]. As a result,
the vast majority of the grid equipment is now 40 years old or more. Experts note
that such a remarkably long service age comes from the robust construction of the
equipment itself [13]. But ultimately, old equipment wears out. With failure rates
that abruptly increase with age, old equipment contributes to system unreliability.
The concern for utilities is not the aging of a single device, but the large amount
of equipment simultaneously reaching an age that is synonymous with high failure
rates (Figure 1). This phenomenon is known as the “escalation” of component failure
rates. Utilities use this terminology to anticipate the potentially overwhelming costs
to maintain and to replace old equipment [14, 15].
Circuit breakers are no exception to this observation of aging power systems in
need for overdue upgrades. The replacement of circuit breakers in a single substation
already costs millions of dollars. Considering the important number of substations in
major grids, budget-related delays in equipment maintenance and upgrades and the
lack of manpower to complete these upgrades adversely affect the reliability of power
systems [16].
Statistical fraction of 
equipment of given age 
at present time t
Age (years)
0 50Average equipment age 
at time t
Component 
failure rate 
“bathtub” curve
Progression at future 
time t + Δt
(assuming no significant 
changes in inventory)
Δt
Figure 1: Illustration of the escalation of component failure rates.
The combination of equipment aging and equipment operation beyond its rated
current significantly increases the chances of system failures. Safety and operational
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margins are reduced at the same time. A better understanding of the process causing
fault currents to increase and leading to breaker adequacy issues, in conjunction
with the existing knowledge of phenomena associated with equipment aging, can help
prevent breaker failures and improve the reliability of power systems.
1.2.3 Causes for Grid Improvement Latency
Long before the August 2003 blackout, former U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richard-
son had warned U.S. political leaders of the urgent need to address the deteriorating
state of the U.S. infrastructure:
We are a major superpower with a third-world electrical grid [. . . ] Our
grid is antiquated. It needs serious modernization [12, 17, 18].
Traditional utility culture and planning processes have overlooked the issue of
equipment massively reaching an advanced service age [13]. Another reason for the
latency of grid improvements is the inability to reengineer certain obsolete system
layouts that would otherwise provide additional operating flexibility [19]. As a result,
many utilities have either operated parts of their system above their design limits or
let their infrastructures decline by delaying capital replacements until the equipment
failed. The latter practice is known as the “run-to-failure” approach [20].
Because of the aging failure rate escalation, utilities face overwhelming and urgent
equipment upgrades that might not be possible with the resources they currently have.
The recent massive grid failures in North America highlighted the need to revise
the maintenance and planning of power systems [6]. Perhaps as a result of lessons
learned during these major outages, recent planning methodologies strive to make
reliability studies an integral part of a process that ensures there is enough generation,
transmission, and distribution capacity available to serve customer loads and face
unexpected events [21]. In a word, equipment adequacy, including circuit breaker
adequacy, is becoming part of new power system operating and planning practices.
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1.3 Problem Statement and Thesis Outline
Circuit breakers are the most important component for the reliability of power grids.
They isolate faulted areas of power systems to preserve normal operating conditions
elsewhere. A failed circuit breaker means a protection barrier against faults lost and
a reduction of system reliability. Therefore, avoiding circuit breaker failures is critical
to preventing undesired extended outages.
Because short-circuit currents can heavily damage electrical equipment and pro-
duce dangerous increases in ground potential, faults must be quickly cleared without
compromising the proper operation of the rest of the system. The oldest and most
overdutied switchgear cannot interrrupt increased fault current levels without a high
probability of failure. On one hand, it takes time before old and underrated breakers
are replaced; on the other hand, the protection of the power system must perform
reliably during that time. Regardless of when underrated breakers are replaced, un-
derrated breakers pose new operating and protection constraints that eventually affect
the operation of power systems.
The objective of the proposed research is to examine power system operating con-
straints and strategies to reduce the failure probability of overdutied circuit breakers
and circumvent the problem of circuit breaker adequacy. The background idea is to
keep fault currents within the interrupting capability of overstressed breakers when-
ever such breakers are required to operate. Specifically, the proposed work provides
methodologies to
• build a circuit breaker reliability model that accounts for new implications of
increased fault currents;
• determine and evaluate constraints on the operation of the network to reduce
circuit breaker failure from these increased fault currents and improve the reli-
ability of the system; and
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• suggest possible remedial actions in an attempt to circumvent the issues of
underrated circuit breakers.
This thesis is organized as follows: Two chapters are devoted to the fundamen-
tal role and limits of power system operation and protection to clarify the need to
preserve circuit breaker adequacy. Specifically, the principles of power systems oper-
ation and fault analysis are reviewed in Chapter 2; the functionality and limitations
of circuit breakers, protective relays, and other protection devices are described in
Chapter 3. With the highlight of key operating and protection principles that are
relevant to the need to preserve circuit breaker adequacy, existing strategies to cir-
cumvent circuit breaker inadequacy are reviewed in Chapter 4. Two other chapters
are devoted to a reliability assessment of overstressed breakers and the implications
of breaker operating limits on power systems. A methodology to assess the reliability
and predict the lifetime of circuit breakers with regard to the growth of the power
system is presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the implications of operating the
system at a desired reliability level are investigated, and possible remedial actions to
address circuit breaker inadequacy are suggested. The concepts presented through-
out this study and directions for future applications are illustrated in Chapter 7 with
numerical examples applied to a modified IEEE 24-bus test system.
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CHAPTER II
POWER SYSTEMS OPERATION PRINCIPLES
2.1 Overview
To avoid circuit breaker failures, an understanding of the core principles of power
systems operation and protection is required. The flow of currents and expected
levels of fault currents through circuit breakers are dictated by the solutions of the
power flow and economic dispatch problems. Thus, the reliability of circuit breakers
is determined from the conditions of the power flow and economic dispatch problems.
The operational concepts of power systems are described in this chapter, and the
focus is on power flow, economic dispatch, and basic fault analysis. As a sequel to
fault analysis, protection devices and the fundamentals of power systems protection
are the subject of Chapter 3.
2.2 Power Systems Models
Notations for electrical quantities are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of phasor notations.
Notations RMSa Angle Time-Domain Phasor Steady-State Phasorb
Voltage V (t) δ(t) V˜ (t) = V (t) e j(ωt+δ(t)) V˜ = V e jδ
Current I(t) θ(t) I˜(t) = I(t) e j(ωt+θ(t)) I˜ = I e jθ
aRoot mean square.
bIndependent of time.
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2.2.1 Symmetrical Component Models
Balanced phase voltages V˜A, V˜B, and V˜C and phase currents I˜A, I˜B, and I˜C are of the
same magnitude and 120◦ apart. The succession of phases (A, B, C) in this particular
order is conventionally called the positive sequence:
V˜A
V˜B
V˜C
 =

1
a2
a
V e jδ,

I˜A
I˜B
I˜C
 =

1
a2
a
 I e jθ, with a = e j 2pi3 = e j120◦ .
The (A, C, B) sequence is called the negative sequence. There is also a homopolar
(zero) sequence that reflects currents in neutral conductors.
The Fortescue transformation converts per-phase circuit voltages into positive,
negative, and zero sequence components V˜1, V˜2, and V˜0, and vice-versa [22]:
V˜1
V˜2
V˜0
 = 13

1 a a2
1 a2 a
1 1 1


V˜A
V˜B
V˜C
 and

V˜A
V˜B
V˜C
 =

1 1 1
a2 a 1
a a2 1


V˜1
V˜2
V˜0
 .
The same transformation also applies to currents. Equivalent sequence circuits are
obtained from the relationships between sequence voltages and currents.
Compared to per-phase models, symmetrical components simplify power flow com-
putations by decoupling the equations involving mutual impedances (Figure 2), under
the assumption that power systems are perfectly symmetric and energized with bal-
anced sources. As a result, the positive, negative, and zero sequence equivalent circuits
can be solved separately. Moreover, ideal balanced sinusoidal operation implies that
the only non-zero component of voltage sources is the positive sequence. The solu-
tion to the positive sequence equivalent network alone is then sufficient to obtain all
system voltages and currents. The consequence of the simplicity of this approach is
that most network models for power flow and state estimation use positive-sequence
equivalent parameters only.
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Figure 2: Transformation of a generator model from (a) three-phase to (b) equivalent
circuits using symmetrical components.
In reality, certain power system components such as untransposed transmission
lines are not symmetric. Because of asymmetries, symmetrical component models
introduce a systematic error of about 6% in per-phase electrical quantities [23]. As
a result, the systematic modeling approach with symmetrical components is being
reconsidered as high fidelity is nowadays expected from power system models.
2.2.2 Three-Phase Physical Power System Models
Advanced power system models are three-phase physical models that correspond to
the physical layout and connections of all phases. Physical models of transmission
lines are defined by the type and layout of the cables and shield wires, the geometry of
the towers, the line length, soil properties, and more. Physical parameters of motors
and generators include the size, materials, and density of stator and rotor windings.
Because no approximations or symmetry assumptions are introduced, the simulations
of physical models are more accurate than simulations of models that use symmetrical
components only.
In three-phase physical models, each phase is modeled separately, and the volt-
ages and currents are computed for each phase individually. Fault currents through
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each breaker pole capture the asymmetries of the system. In addition, the ground-
ing structures and impedances are an integral part of the network models. Explicit
grounding models give mathematical access to the exact impedance of the ground
current return path [24]. Indeed, the ground impedance directly affects the ground
potential rise and the level of fault currents the breakers have to interrupt.
2.3 Power Flow Equations and Solution
The power flow solution of a network model is the basis for circuit breaker fault
analysis and subsequent reliability assessments. Determining how much power flows
through each transmission line of a network is thoroughly described in the literature
[25, 26, 27]. To solve the power flow problem for sinusoidal steady-state operation, it
is sufficient to determine the voltage phasor V˜k = Vk e
jδk at every system bus k.
The power flow equations express the real (P ) and reactive power (Q) balance
at every bus in the system. The power balance is written as the equality between
the injected power (from generators and loads) and the power carried or lost through
the transmission paths to neighboring buses and to the ground. Using the single-line
model with positive-sequence admittances y = g+ jb and the nomenclature shown in
Figure 3, the equations for real and reactive power balance are
Pg,k − Pd,k = V 2k
gk + ∑
m∈K(k)
(gk,m + gs,k,m)
− Vk ∑
m∈K(k)
αk,mVm, (1)
Qg,k −Qd,k = −V 2k
bk + ∑
m∈K(k)
(bk,m + bs,k,m)
− Vk ∑
m∈K(k)
βk,mVm, (2)
where
αk,m = gk,m cos(δk − δm) + bk,m sin(δk − δm),
βk,m = gk,m sin(δk − δm)− bk,m cos(δk − δm).
There are three types of buses: slack (often times, Bus 1), PV, and PQ. Depending
on the type of each bus, not all of the power balance equations above can be used
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to obtain the power flow solution. In a system with n buses, including nq PQ buses,
there are n−1+nq unknowns or state variables (highlighted in Table 3) and n−1+nq
independent equations that constitute the power flow equations.
Individual load and generator characteristics make the power flow equations (1)
and (2) non-linear. Algorithms such as Newton’s method or Gauss-Seidel’s method
are thus used to solve the power flow equations numerically. To increase the accu-
racy of the power flow results, the solution of a generalized quadratic power flow
formulation using Newton’s method is presented in Chapter 5.
~ To other buses 
m΄ ∈ K(k)
Bus k
Bus m
gk
gk,m
gs,k,m gs,m,k
Vk ∠ δk
Pg,k + jQg,k
Pd,k + jQd,k
Transmission line model with 
pi-equivalent admittances
Ground 
admittance
Demand/load 
power
Generated power
bk,m
bk bs,k,m bs,m,k
Figure 3: Simplified single-line model of a generic bus and a transmission line.
Table 3: Selection of power flow state variables and equations.
Bus Type Quantity Known Quantities Unknowns and
State Variables
Equations to
Use
Slack 1 V1, δ1 = 0
◦ Pg,1, Pd,1, Qg,1, Qd,1 None
PQ nq Pg,k, Pd,k, Qg,k, Qd,k Vk , δk (1), (2)
PV n− 1− nq Pg,k, Pd,k, Vk Qg,k, Qd,k, δk (1)
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2.4 Economic Dispatch with Security Constraints
The economic dispatch (ED) of generators affects fault analysis because fault currents
are determined by the capacity of all the generators in service, regardless of the
power actually produced. Therefore, the ED is an opportunity to introduce operating
constraints related to transmission capacity, natural resources, and fault current levels
when it comes to preserving the adequacy of circuit breakers.
The economic dispatch is an optimization process that determines the output
power assigned to each generator in the system. It is formally defined as
the operation of generation facilities to produce energy at the lowest cost
to reliably serve consumers, recognizing any operational limits of genera-
tion and transmission facilities (2005 U.S. Energy Policy Act [28]).
Operational constraints are, on one hand, the costs, capacities, resource needs,
and startup or shutdown times of the generators, and, on the other hand, the hourly,
weekly, seasonal, and weather-related fluctuations of the load. The load pattern used
in the IEEE Reliability Test System [29, 30] is shown in Figure 4.
The ED is run by utilities one to several days ahead using load forecasts, and the
generator outputs obtained are adjusted during the day as the load varies. Real-time
ED is also performed when generating resources must be adjusted within minutes.
Only generators with small inertia, such as small turbines, wind farms, or hydro-
electric plants, are subject to short-term economic dispatch. Large coal or nuclear
plants require much longer times to adjust power, and such plants typically maintain
the same power output.
The economic dispatch is achieved in a two-step process. The first step is a pure
economic dispatch that assigns real power outputs. The second step is a reactive
power (VAR) dispatch that assigns reactive power throughout the system to keep
voltage levels in typical operating ranges.
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(c) Hourly variation of load by weekday and season
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Figure 4: Load model of the IEEE Reliability Test System: (a) seasonal, (b) weekly,
(c) hourly by weekday and season.
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2.4.1 Generator Cost Function
The cost function f of a generator depends on its output power Pg. This cost function
is commonly written in quadratic form as
f(Pg) = (a+ bPg + cP
2
g ),
with a, b, and c being the quadratic cost coefficients for the generator.
The cost coefficients are computed using the rated thermal or heat output of the
generators. The quadratic cost comes from two different contributions: operating
and maintenance (O&M) costs and fuel costs. In the IEEE Reliability Test System,
O&M costs consist of a fixed cost aOM and a variable cost bOM proportional to the
output power Pg [29, 30]. Example fuel costs are shown in Table 4 (Jan.–July 2007
estimates [31], except uranium cost [29]).
Table 4: Sample fuel costs for generator operation.
Fuel Cost ($/MBtua)
Coal 1.77
Uranium 0.60
#2 oil 13.59
#6 oil 7.85
Natural gas 7.37
a1 Btu (British Thermal Unit) = 1055 J.
The cost function for one plant can be computed as follows [27]. The column
vector h groups nh different rated heat rates, in other words, the different amounts
of energy to operate the generator per unit time:
h =

h1
h2
...
hnh

.
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Let the power matrix A be defined with the rated output power Pr,k associated with
each heat rate hk, k = 1 . . . nh:
A =

1 Pr,1 P
2
r,1
1 Pr,2 P
2
r,2
...
...
...
1 Pr,nh P
2
r,nh

.
Let x0 be the quadratic coefficients for the energy needed to operate the plant per
unit time:
x0 =

a0
b0
c0
 (in energy per unit time).
Then, the product Ax0 also contains the different amounts of energy to operate the
plant per unit time. As a result, Ax0 = h.
The least square approximation yields
x0 =
(
AT A
)−1
AT h.
Note that the coefficients a0, b0, and c0 do not include the price of fuels pFuel.
The final cost coefficients a, b, and c are therefore
a = a0 pFuel + aOM ,
b = b0 pFuel + bOM ,
c = c0 pFuel.
2.4.2 Pure Economic Dispatch Formulation
The economic dispatch (ED) determines the cheapest combination of generator out-
puts that provides the real power required for the load and estimated transmission
losses under normal conditions. (Power exported to neighboring systems is neglected.)
Not all generators are necessarily put in service. For generators that are in service,
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the assigned power must be between the rated minimum and maximum outputs. This
process is called pure economic dispatch because it does not account for factors other
than fuel and O&M costs. The pure ED problem is formulated as follows:
minimize
∑
i
fi(Pg,i) =
∑
i
(ai + biPg,i + ciP
2
g,i)
subject to
∑
i
Pg,i − PLoad − PLosses = 0
xiPg,i,min ≤ Pg,i ≤ xiPg,i,max ∀ i
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i,
where
xi = 1 if generator i is connected, 0 otherwise (decision variable),
Pg,i is the real power output of generator i (decision variable),
Pg,i,min and Pg,i,max are the minimum and maximum output of generator i, and
PLoad and PLosses are the total real power for the system load and estimated losses.
The problem is a mixed-integer problem with a quadratic cost function and linear
constraints. The integer variables can be initially neglected (xi = 1 ∀ i), and the
resulting simplified problem can be solved using methods such as Wolfe’s decomposi-
tion [32]. The integer variables are then set to
xi =
 1 if Pg,i 6= 00 if Pg,i = 0 ∀ i.
2.4.3 VAR Dispatch
The VAR dispatch problem assigns the reactive power output of the generators while
• maintaining currents within the ratings of all transmission paths and
• maintaining the bus voltage magnitudes to acceptable values
(typically, 0.95 ≤ Vk ≤ 1.05 p.u. for each bus k).
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The solution to the pure economic dispatch problem is the initial guess for the VAR
dispatch problem. The generic formulation of the VAR dispatch problem is
minimize
∑
i
wi |Qg,i|+
∑
j
wj |bcap,j|+
∑
k
wk |breact,k|+M(∆PMis + ∆QMis)
subject to |Ii,j| < Ii,j,max ∀(i, j) pair of nodes (i 6= j)
Vi,min ≤ Vi ≤ Vi,max ∀ i
0 ≤ bcap,j ≤ xcap,j bcap,j,max ∀ j
0 ≤ breact,k ≤ xreact,k breact,k,max ∀ k
xcap,j, xreact,k ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j, k,
where
xcap,j = 1 and xreact,k = 1 if capacitor j and reactor k are connected, 0 otherwise,
Qg,i is the output of generator i,
∆PMis and ∆QMis are mismatches between the dispatched real and reactive power
and the actual real and reactive power demand, and
Ii,j is the current between nodes i and j.
(Ti,j may replace Ii,j as the generalized flow between nodes i and j.)
The []max subscript (e.g. in Ii,j,max) designates the maximum value of the corre-
sponding variable. The decision variables are Qg,i, bcap,j, and breact,k, weighted by the
coefficients wi, wj, and wk, respectively.
The two-step economic dispatch presented above is part of a more complex process
that involves a variety of objectives and constraints that include
• minimization of transmission losses,
• power flow constraints (optimal power flow problem),
• emission and environment-related restrictions [33],
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• reliability and operational limits of machines, lines, and switchgear, and
• prime mover fuel or natural resource availability.
In this study, the focus is on constraints imposed on power systems operation by the
operational and reliability limits of overstressed circuit breakers. Once operational
constraints are established, they are integrated into the security-constrained economic
dispatch that determines the commitment and output of all generators.
Once an instance of an economic dispatch problem is formulated, a solution can be
obtained using a number of optimization methods, such as decomposition, relaxation,
genetic algorithms, and particle swarm.
2.4.4 Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch
From its definition in the Energy Policy Act, one important focus of the economic
dispatch is the reliability of power systems. Certain reliability levels must be main-
tained in the case of contingencies (e.g. the absence of one or several generators, lines,
or breakers).
To maintain reliability, operational limits are defined to account for transmission
lines congestion, system frequency, and voltage levels. Equipment failures occur if
the system operated beyond these limits. When the operational and reliability limits
are factored into the economic dispatch constraints, the economic dispatch problem
is called security-constrained economic dispatch problem. Generator outputs are ad-
justed accordingly to avoid operating any transmission and distribution device beyond
its capacity or reliability limits.
2.4.5 Optimal Power Flow
The power flow problems and economic dispatch problems previously described can
be combined together to ensure that the operation of power systems is achieved
at the lowest cost while including the constraints of all the generators, loads, and,
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possibly, circuit breaker operating limits. The optimization problem that results of
the combination of the power flow and economic dispatch problems is called the
optimal power flow.
The optimal power flow problem is actually an economic dispatch problem in which
the power flow equations are included as a constraint. The generalized formulation
of an optimal power flow problem is
minimize
∑
i
fi(Pg,i) =
∑
i
(ai + biPg,i + ciP
2
g,i)
subject to g(x, Pg,i) = 0∑
i
Pg,i − PLoad − PLosses = 0
xiPg,i,min ≤ Pg,i ≤ xiPg,i,max ∀ i
VAR dispatch constraints
Other system constraints
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i,
where g(x, u) = 0 represent the generalized power flow equations. The decision
variables are Pg,i, Qg,i, xi, and the decision variables of the VAR dispatch problem.
Power systems operations have ramifications in many domains, including genera-
tor control, reactive power control, and load management. Circuit breaker reliability
introduces a new set of operating constraints for the security-constrained economic
dispatch and the optimal power flow. Because it includes constraints from many as-
pects of power systems, the optimal power flow appears as the backbone of power
systems operations.
2.5 Fault Conditions in Power Systems
2.5.1 Overview
Faults (or short circuits) start with the dielectric breakdown of air or insulators, or
by direct contact of an external artifact with the conductors. Faults usually occur as
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a result of insulation defects or undesired line contacts from line or tree sags, critters,
storms, and other situations beyond human control. Faults involve one or more phases
that are accidentally connected to the neutral, to the ground, or together. A fault is
likely to be of one of the types shown in Table 5. The actual probabilities of the faults
encountered vary with the environment that surrounds the transmission system.
Table 5: Illustration and typical incidence of power system faults.
Fault Type Single-phase to Line-to-line Line-to-line-to Three-phase
ground/neutral ground/neutral
B
C
A A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
Incidence 80% 10% 8% 2%
Fault currents are much more intense than regular load currents. All short cir-
cuits should be cleared as fast as possible because of the severe stresses (mechanical,
thermal, and magnetic) and the dangerous ground potential rise that are imposed on
the components of the system.
To avoid equipment damage, protective relays must quickly detect faults, and cir-
cuit breakers must isolate the appropriate circuits. Unnecessary wear to circuit break-
ers and operation of circuit breakers beyond their interrupting capabilities should be
avoided to prevent outages. Circuit breakers and other protective devices are de-
scribed in Chapter 3.
A fault may be the first event of a cascading sequence, where overload protection
functions create a snowball effect by transferring the cumulated load from interrupted
lines to the lines that remain in service. Eventually, lines are automatically removed
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one after the other. For instance, the cascading effect that resulted in the North-
eastern American blackout in August 2003 started with the disconnection of two
transmission lines in Eastern Ohio, USA. These two lines were automatically discon-
nected after faults were initiated by excessive line sagging and resulting contacts with
surrounding trees [34]. Reduced operating margins from this unexpected protection
operation did not help the system accommodate the subsequent events that led to
the blackout.
2.5.2 Basic Short-Circuit Analysis
The root mean square (RMS) value of the current at the time of circuit breaker
operation is the quantity of interest to assess breaker adequacy because it determines
the intensity of the electric arc, contact erosion, and subsequent dielectric recovery
conditions. After the onset of a fault, the RMS value of the current through a breaker
increases and varies with time. The exact RMS value of the interrupted current
depends on the actual time of breaker operation.
Short-circuit currents consist of a symmetric (AC, sinusoidal) component and a
decaying asymmetric (DC) component [35, 36] (Figure 5). The exact magnitude of
the DC component depends on the nature of the fault and the power factor at the
inception of the fault.
In single-phase equivalent models, the RMS value I of the AC component is
I =
V√
R2 + (ωL)2
, (3)
where V is the voltage of the equivalent source of the system, ω its pulsation, and R
and L are the equivalent resistance and inductance of the faulted circuit.
The expression for the RMS value of the total fault current as a function of the
time t ellapsed after the onset of the fault is
IF (t) = I
√
1 + 2e−2RL t. (4)
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The maximum RMS value of the total fault current is I
√
3 at t = 0 (at the
inception of the fault). From Equation (4), the DC offset can increase the magnitude
of the interrupted current by a factor as high as 1.73. The DC component decays
exponentially at a rate governed by a DC time constant τ = L/R.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the DC offset on fault currents.
The X/R ratio is commonly used in place of L/R (X = ωL). The X/R ratio
reflects the prevalence of the inductance in the whole system. Standard values of
the X/R ratio are 14 and 17 at 50 and 60 Hz, respectively, and correspond to τ =
45 ms [37]. The DC time constant τ increases with conductor concentration [38]
(especially in dense urban areas), the addition of distributed sources, and, more
generally, changes in the resistive and reactive properties of power systems equipment
[39]. High values of τ mean slow decay of the DC offset and increased breaker duties.
Hence, the X/R ratio affects circuit breaker stresses and reliability levels.
2.5.3 Fault Currents and Circuit Breaker Ratings
Before 1964, circuit breakers were rated using the RMS value of total fault currents,
with both AC and DC components included. Since 1964, circuit breakers are rated
based on the RMS value of the AC component of fault currents only [40]. The DC
offset accompanies most faults, causing the total RMS current to be slightly higher
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than the AC RMS current alone. The same rule applies to breaker ratings: ratings
based on AC currents only are smaller than ratings that include the DC offset. Cases
may arise where breakers properly rated using total fault currents may be underrated
using the AC component of fault currents only. Without supporting evidence, it is
impossible to determine whether a breaker is rated following the pre-1964 or the post-
1964 standards. Such situations may be dealt with field tests or using a conservative
circuit breaker rating.
2.6 Circuit Breaker Operational Limits and Power Systems
Operation
The particularity of circuit breaker operational limits lies in the infrequent nature
of circuit breaker operations. Circuit breakers do not present any reliability issue or
hazard as long as they remain closed, whether fault currents exceed their interrupting
capability or not. In other words, circuit breakers are not the limiting constraint when
considering the SCED based on steady-state currents.
In contrast, breakers may fail when triggered to clear fault conditions. Interruption
success or failure cannot be predicted because the internal condition of the breaker
and the magnitude of currents during the next fault cannot be observed. Because the
interruption success or failure is not known until after the actual breaker operation,
breaker failures are called hidden failures [41].
Because all breaker failures are hidden failures, the quantification of breaker failure
rates is challenging. Because fault current magnitudes are not known in advance,
statistical or probabilistic methods are necessary to estimate breaker stresses and
failure rates.
One highlight of the proposed work is to formulate and quantify circuit breaker
operational limits that serve as constraints for the economic dispatch and unit com-
mitment problems. The integration of such constraints in power system operations
results in benchmarks to achieve set levels of system reliability.
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2.7 Summary
Operational concepts of power systems, such as power flow, economic dispatch, and
basic fault analysis, are presented in this chapter in the light of assessing circuit
breaker adequacy. A general formulation of the respective mathematical problems
is provided. Fundamentally, the power flow and the available generating capacity in
normal operation are the initial conditions to determine fault currents through circuit
breakers and assess breaker adequacy. In other words, the stresses and reliability of
circuit breakers derive from the power flow and economic dispatch.
As faults randomly strike during day-to-day operations of power systems, pro-
tection naturally complements power systems operation. Protection schemes are de-
signed to prevent power systems from exceeding the operating limits defined in the
economic dispatch and power flow problems. Therefore, effective and reliable pro-
tection against power system faults cannot be achieved without an understanding of
power systems operation and the different protection mechanisms in use. Chapter 3 is
devoted to a presentation of the characteristics and limits of circuit breakers, protec-
tive relays, fault current limiters, and substation layouts that are the basis on which
protection schemes are built.
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CHAPTER III
UNDERSTANDING POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
DEVICES
3.1 Power System Protection Philosophy
The philosophy of power systems protection has not fundamentally changed despite
technological progress. Effective power systems protection is essential to minimize
the impact of faults on electrical equipment, including mechanical stresses, thermal
stresses, and power quality problems. Effective protection relies on
• fast fault detection;
• fast and selective fault clearing to minimize the affected area; and
• reliable operation of protection devices to reduce occurrences of widespread,
common-mode outages.
Circuit breakers are central to power systems protection. They are often called
the “last barrier to protect other parts of a circuit or a network against faults” [42].
Unfortunately, circuit breakers are also the weakest elements of protection schemes,
since many power outages involve a breaker failure [43]. With increased fault currents
caused by power systems growth, many circuit breakers are to become overstressed,
and the probability of outages caused by a breaker failure is bound to increase.
This central position of circuit breakers is reinforced by the roles and limita-
tions of other protective devices, such as protective relays and fault current limiters.
Therefore, the focus of this chapter is on a functional description of circuit breakers,
protective relays, and fault current limiters. Also, since breakers provide flexible and
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redundant connectivity inside substations, the effect of substation breaker arrange-
ments on the protection and reliability of power systems is also discussed.
Two emerging issues of the power systems protection landscape are the need for
offline testing of protection schemes and the coordination of protection schemes with
distributed generation (DG). Both of these issues are relevant to circuit breaker ad-
equacy: first, relay testing ensures, using simulated conditions, that overstressed
breakers are not operated when fault currents excess their ratings. Second, the in-
tegration of DG in the protection schemes of distribution networks allows relays to
disconnect DG during fault conditions. Circuit breakers that are overstressed with
DG connected may be brought back within their interrupting capability once DG
is disconnected and the fault currents contributed by DG are removed. Protection
scheme testing is described in Section 3.3 dealing with relays. Integrating DG in the
protection of distribution networks is discussed in Chapter 4, where existing practices
are reviewed.
3.2 Circuit Breakers
3.2.1 Functional Challenges
According to IEEE and IEC definitions, a circuit breaker is
a mechanical switching device, capable of making, carrying, and breaking
currents under normal circuit conditions and also, making and carrying
for a specified time and breaking currents under specified abnormal circuit
conditions such as those of short circuit [44, 45].
A high-voltage circuit breaker is depicted in Figure 6. Circuit breakers are protective,
heavy-duty switches that must obey specific constraints:
When closed, breakers are good conductors, and they withstand normal
and short-circuit currents, thermally and mechanically.
When open, they are excellent insulators, and they withstand the voltage
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to ground or to the other phases, and the voltage between contacts.
When closed, they can interrupt a rated short-circuit current quickly with-
out generating an abnormal voltage.
When opened, they can close a shorted circuit quickly and safely without
incidental contact erosion [46].
Breaker tank and
arcing chamber
Bushing (insulator)
Phase conductor
Control closet
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Figure 6: Picture of a high-voltage, outdoor circuit breaker at the San Francisco/San
Mateo substation (courtesy Pacific Gas and Electric Company).
In addition, breakers must operate in specific environments without creating haz-
ards. Explosives, dust, humidity, and seismic regions illustrate frequent extreme
conditions for circuit breaker operation.
Because of these constraints, maintaining high circuit breaker reliability is critical
and challenging. Most technical requirements of high-voltage circuit breakers can
be found in IEEE and IEC standards. The main technical aspects and references
relevant to circuit breakers are presented in this section.
3.2.2 Electric Arcs and Switchgear
Electric arcs were discovered independently by Vasilii Petrov from Russia in 1802 and
Sir Humphrey Davy from England in 1808 [47, 48]. General works on arcs and plasmas
[49, 50, 51] rely on fundamental theories established by Cassie, Browne, and Mayr.
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Electric arcs are essential to circuit breaker operation, and their role is thoroughly
described in the literature [42, 46, 52, 53, 54].
The highly inductive nature of power systems makes it impossible to interrupt
currents instantaneously. At power system voltages, any attempt to open an en-
ergized circuit results in an electric arc appearing between the separated contacts.
After contact separation, the current continues flowing as long as the arc exists. In
one experiment, an impressive electric arc was obtained (and video-taped) after a dis-
connect switch failed to open a 500-kV line that was carrying only 100 A [55]. Despite
the failure of the disconnect switch, the arcs from the experiment are insignificant
compared to the ones associated with faults that draw 100 times the normal current.
An electric arc is a narrow, bright, and conductive plasma channel. The ionization
from the plasma may extend to surrounding liquids, gases, and electrode (contact)
materials. Arcs appear when the space (or gap) between two contacts has not acquired
the dielectric strength to withstand the system voltage (up to 800 kV). The typical
temperature of the core of an arc is between 6000 ◦C and 20,000 ◦C. (Higher values
can be reached in vacuum breakers [42, 50].) Of course, the size, temperature, and
brightness of an arc increase with the current through the arc.
The destructive nature of an arc comes from its high temperature and from the
pressure wave associated with a steep temperature gradient between the core and the
outside of the arc. (The temperature of an arc changes from 20 ◦C to 6000 ◦C over a
few millimeters.) Arcs gradually erode the contacts of circuit breakers after each fault
interruption. If not properly interrupted, arcs with a destructive power that is orders
of magnitude higher than with arcs used in soldering can cause extensive equipment
damage and serious injuries.
Low-frequency arcs (below 1 Hz) may self-extinguish if there is enough time for
such arcs to cool down; however, at power system frequencies, arcs do not extinguish
by themselves. For example, a 30 kV, 50 Hz arc burning between plates 1 meter apart
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does not extinguish spontaneously [42]. In addition, the more current carried in an
arc, the more difficult it is to extinguish that arc. The main challenge for circuit
breakers is to extinguish very intense arcs that are created when opening a faulted
line.
The key to interrupting an arc is to bring the instantaneous current through the
arc to zero. In AC circuits, the current crosses zero twice per cycle. In DC circuits,
the current does not alternate, and it must be forced to zero either by increasing the
arc voltage or by injecting an opposing current. Since DC circuits are marginal in
major transmission systems, they fall out of the scope of this study.
In AC power systems, when the instantaneous current of an arc reaches zero,
that arc stops burning. The gap that is established between the arcing contacts
starts recovering its dielectric properties by recombination of electrons and ionized
molecules. The first objective of a circuit breaker is to extinguish arcs, and this
objective is spontaneously achieved.
When a breaker extinguishes an arc, the inductive nature of power systems causes
the voltage between the breaker contacts to shortly peak between 1.5 and 3 times
the system voltage. This voltage spike is known as the transient recovery voltage
(TRV). A simulated TRV waveform is shown in Figure 7; actual TRV waveforms
from measurement records can be found in the literature [56]. At this point, the
second objective of a breaker is to prevent a restrike. IEEE standard C37.011 [57]
specifies the TRV that circuit breakers must withstand during the moments (millisec-
onds) following the extinction of an arc. If the TRV increases fast enough and exceeds
the dielectric strength of the gap, the arc restrikes; the resurrected arc must be ex-
tinguished again at the next instant of zero current. When opening a faulted circuit,
if an arc restrikes while the breaker is fully open, the breaker failed to interrupt the
fault [58].
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Figure 7: Simulated transient recovery voltage waveform across the poles of a breaker
after fault interruption.
The environment in the gap can be altered to accelerate arc quenching (extinction)
and prevent restrikes. In some SF6 breakers, fresh gas is blown into the gap to
accelerate the recombination of molecules. In air-magnetic breakers, arcs may be
artificially elongated using the magnetic field of the fault current itself.
To conclude, although electric arcs are an essential part of fault interruption,
circuit breakers must extinguish them fast and prevent a restrike; otherwise, faults are
not isolated. Therefore, the mechanical components of circuit breakers are designed
for a quick separation of contacts (within 2–10 cycles of the beginning of the fault),
and the insulating medium must have fast dielectric recovery.
The various mechanical components and insulating media of circuit breakers are
discussed next. The reliability of these components are the basis of the proposed
circuit breaker reliability model presented in Chapter 5.
3.2.3 The Interrupting Medium
Circuit breakers are characterized by their interrupting media because of the central
role played by these insulating materials in circuit breaker operation. Indeed, the
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interrupting medium directly participates in arc quenching, withstands the system
voltage, and prevents restrikes and accidental flashovers across open breaker contacts.
Air, oil, vacuum, and SF6 are the most common dielectric materials used in circuit
breakers. Key properties of these interrupting media are listed in Table 6.
Table 6: Typical properties of circuit breaker interrupting media.
Material Air Oil Vacuum SF6
Max. voltage (kV) 15/765a [59] 360 [59] 38 800
Costb N/A $3/gal. [60] N/A $20/lb [61]
Availability ∼1900/1940a 1900 1962 1955 [62]
Dielectric strengthc
(MV/m)
1–3 10 [53] N/A 5 [63]
Supports combustion Yes Yes No No
Toxic No Yes No No
Corrosive Yes (O2) Yes
(pollution)
No Yes
(byproducts)
Colors/odors None Oil None None
Densityc (kg/m3) 1.2 800–900 [64] 10−9 [59] 6.2 [65]
Pollution-proof No No No Yes
Recovery speed of
dielectric strength
Slowest Intermediate Faster Fastest
Environmental impact None Oil spills None Strong green-
house gas
aApplies to air blast circuit breakers.
bEstimated material costs.
cAt 1 bar, ambient temperature (except vacuum).
Oil was the first and preferred interrupting medium until the advent of gas circuit
breakers [59]. Air breakers emerged with the arc-chute mechanism that artificially
elongates and divides arcs into small sections that are easy to extinguish. Air-blast
breakers accommodate high-voltage arcs by blowing high-pressure air into the plasma
[52]. Vacuum circuit breakers are particular because the low pressure (10−4 to 10−1 Pa
[66]) and the lack of materials is turned into an advantage to interrupt arcs. Vacuum
breakers are well-suited for medium-voltage applications up to 38 kV; above that
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level, SF6 is preferred for contact insulation [50].
Sulfur hexafluoride is a very dense gas (five times heavier than air), has a superior
dielectric strength, and quickly recovers from ionization [67]. Despite remarkable in-
sulating properties, SF6 should not be released in the atmosphere. With 22,000 times
the greenhouse power of carbon dioxide (CO2) [68], specific procedures to handle SF6
have been developed [69, 70] to help maintain the releases of this gas at insignifi-
cant levels compared to other greenhouse gases [71]. Alternatives to pure SF6 as an
insulating material (e.g. SF6–N2 mixtures) have also been experimented [72].
3.2.4 The Operating or Trip Mechanism
Trip mechanisms provide the energy necessary to move the contacts of a circuit
breaker from the closed position to the fully open position as fast as possible. This
energy either is stored or directly provided by auxiliary power supplies. The most
common circuit breaker operating mechanisms are described in Table 7.
Because the contacts are mechanically supported, contact parting is not instanta-
neous. The total opening time may take a few cycles (e.g. 40 ms or 2 cycles at 50 or
60 Hz in the most recent breakers [73]).
Table 7: Typical circuit breaker operating mechanisms.
Operating Mechanism Description
Spring The spring is charged with a motor or hydraulically.
Latches lock the breaker in one position or the other.
Pneumatic Contacts are actuated using the sole force of compressed
gas (air, SF6).
Hydraulic Similar to pneumatic. Leaks are reduced using a liquid
actuator (oil) that exhibits the same behavior over a wide
range of temperatures.
Magnetic Latches are actuated through the magnetic field gener-
ated by an energized trip coil.
Motor-driven An electric motor moves the contacts of the circuit
breaker.
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3.2.5 Factors that Determine Circuit Breaker Ratings
The rating or interrupting capability of a circuit breaker is the highest current a
breaker can interrupt without degrading its reliability level. The rating, reliability,
and performance of a circuit breaker is dictated by the design of its different parts.
The design criteria for high-voltage circuit breakers are governed by two comprehen-
sive sets of standards from IEEE and IEC.
3.2.5.1 Design Factors
Contacts The arc interruption process takes place at and between the breaker con-
tacts. The material, geometry, and spacing of the contacts determine the characteris-
tics of the gap during circuit breaker operations. The geometry of the gap determines
the environment in which arcs are extinguished. In addition, the construction of the
contacts affects their ability to sustain frequent or repeated arcing.
Arc Quenching Components The insulating medium dictates the maximum volt-
age that can be applied across the contacts of an open breaker during steady-state and
transients, without creating flashovers. More importantly, the insulating medium di-
rectly participates in arc quenching, either passively or actively. Breakers with puffer-
type mechanisms achieve superior interrupting capabilities by combining strong in-
sulating media (such as SF6) and active arc quenching mechanisms that circulate the
insulating material through the arcing space.
Trip Mechanism The faster the trip mechanism separates the contacts, the faster
faults are cleared, the shorter the arc duration, and the less the breaker and the rest of
the system have to sustain stresses from high fault currents. Fast contact separation
may also help the interrupting medium recovering its dielectric strength. The fault
clearing time should account for the effect of the DC offset and the duration of the
stresses sustained by the equipment.
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Each element of a circuit breaker is built to operate successfully under specific fault
conditions. These conditions are communicated to the end-user as the rated operating
voltage and rated fault currents. The actual capability of a circuit breaker is affected
by manufacturer design margins and contact wear [74]. These margins are selected
by manufacturers to meet certain criteria, including the requirements of both IEEE
and IEC standards [75] and to account for performance degradation with the number
of operations and with time.
A diagram summarizing how circuit breaker ratings relate to the different breaker
components and how breaker ratings determine the interruption success of fault cur-
rents is shown in Figure 8.
Trip mechanism
Contacts/plates
Mechanical support
Insulating material
Circuit breaker components
Circuit breaker design 
and standards
Circuit breaker rating
Determines success in fault 
interruption
Power systems fault
Circuit breaker interruption 
history
Relay command
activa
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affects
affects
affects
Event sequence
Event sequence
Event sequence
Figure 8: Sketch of the interaction of breaker components during fault interruption.
3.2.5.2 Standards for Circuit Breaker Ratings
During the first few cycles that follow the inception of faults, the DC offset increases
the total RMS value of fault currents (and the actual stresses applied to circuit break-
ers) above the RMS value of the AC portion alone. As seen in Chapter 2, the fault
current RMS value can be increased by as a factor as high as 1.73, depending on the
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delay between fault initiation and the opening of breaker contacts.
The rating basis for circuit breakers changed in 1964 from the total RMS value of
fault currents (AC and DC components combined, ANSI/IEEE C37.x standards) to
the RMS value of the AC component alone (C37.0x standards). The change took place
to simplify and to harmonize ANSI/IEEE standards with international standards [40].
The DC offset can be obtained from the AC portion of short-circuit currents using
Equation (4), knowing the equivalent X/R ratio and the breaker clearing time.
The transition from one rating standard to another implies that, without support-
ing evidence, it is impossible to determine whether an old breaker is rated according
to the pre-1964 or the post-1964 standards. Certain breakers properly rated using
total fault currents may be underrated based on the AC portion of fault currents
only; spcific actions should be taken to establish the reliability of such breakers.
The uncertainty on the nameplate rating of the oldest breakers propagates to their
actual interrupting capability when accounting for age and interruption history. The
rating based on total fault currents is conservative but helps avoid overestimating the
rating of an old breaker. This means that if the rating of a circuit breaker is 40 kA,
the 40 kA value already includes the DC offset, and the breaker rating without the
DC offset is less than 40 kA. In sum, the margins to maintain the adequacy of circuit
breakers are reduced when considering total fault currents as opposed to fault currents
without the DC offset.
3.2.5.3 Interrupting Capability Testing
Circuit breaker testing standards ANSI/IEEE C37.09 and IEC 60056 define design
tests and production tests [42]. Design tests include withstanding rated voltages
and currents, withstanding TRVs, close-open cycles at different current magnitudes,
mechanical endurance, and the integrity of enclosures and sealing. Production tests
cover the performance of the trip mechanism and the breaker circuitry.
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Design tests (such as the test of the interrupting capability of a breaker) are
heavier than production tests and may destroy the tested breakers. No utility can
risk the loss of a breaker while attempting to determine its actual rating. As a result,
unlike other performance parameters, circuit breaker ratings cannot be “measured”
in the field, and the nameplates and interruption history are the only information
available to estimate the interrupting capabilities of circuit breakers.
Generating the rated breaking current of a circuit breaker at power system volt-
ages requires large power supplies that can emulate fault conditions. The largest
breaker testing facility is the KEMA High Power Laboratory, located in Arnhem,
the Netherlands. The “short-circuit generators” of that facility can provide up to
10,000 MVA at 60 Hz [76]. Also, the facility has dedicated test circuits for different
applications, such as the testing of 550 kV, 63 kA line breakers [77] or the testing of
27.5 kV, 120 kA generator breakers [78]. Special circuit breakers protect the KEMA
laboratory against the extremely high fault currents drawn during the tests.
If the required fault currents cannot be generated at a testing facility, then circuit
breakers are tested on the grid itself (at the expense of some safety and reliability).
3.3 Protective Relays
3.3.1 Functional Characteristics
Digital relays from several manufacturers are shown in Figure 9. The relays shown are
part of a substation automation laboratory at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Relays contain and execute the protection schemes that are absolutely necessary
to protect power systems. The design of protective relays and protection schemes
has been extensively studied in academia and industry [79, 80, 81]. Protective relays
monitor the electrical variables of circuits they protect, through potential and current
transformers (PTs and CTs) that scale voltages and currents down to 115 V and
5 A nominal, respectively. Using these scaled measurements, relays implement a set
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of specialized functions that detect conditions such as short circuits, voltage sags,
frequency drifts, etc. If a condition is detected by a relay function and the condition
lasts longer than a predefined duration, then the appropriate circuit breakers are
automatically triggered.
Figure 9: Picture of different types of digital protective relays mounted on racks.
Protective relays have been widely used since the end of the 19th century for two
purposes: the protection of high-voltage transmission systems [82] and the protection
and signaling of electrified city railroads [83, 84].
3.3.2 Electromechanical vs. Numerical Relays
Electromechanical relays open and close protection circuits as a response to the mag-
netic forces and the thermal effects that accompany abnormal voltages and currents.
Protection circuits trigger circuit breakers when certain relay states are simultane-
ously met. Electromechanical relays are equipped with dials that determine their
operating thresholds (voltages and currents) and time delays.
The protection offered against one abnormality (e.g. overcurrents, voltage sags)
is called a function. An electromechanical relay implements one protection function
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only. Protection against multiple abnormalities requires multiple functions and mul-
tiple electromechanical relays. The calibration and testing of electromechanical relays
is challenging because of the inherent inaccuracies in the construction of these relays
and the limited number of standard ratios for potential and current transformers
[85]. The drawbacks of electromechanical relays are therefore in (i) the number of
relays required to build a comprehensive protection scheme and (ii) the calibration
and testing required for the correct operation of each relay utilized.
Numerical (computer-based) relays were introduced in the late 1960s to take ad-
vantage of the advanced signal processing capabilities of microprocessors [86]. Nu-
merical relays implement comprehensive sets of protection functions and can be finely
configured to produce a specific response to any power system event.
3.3.3 Protection, Margins, and Coordination
One could argue that detecting and clearing short-circuit currents before they become
too intense is the way to operate overstressed circuit breakers. Such an argument
would obviously void the interest of the proposed study. Three practical reasons
explain why it is not possible to interrupt faults at the very instant they initiate.
The first reason is to avoid undesired relay operations during transients and tempo-
rary overloads (when carried currents exceeds rated line currents). Utilities overload
certain transmission corridors by 5 to 20% to compensate for the lack of transmission
capacity when the demand peaks [87]. In addition, motor startup and transformer
magnetization typically draw currents at least 6 times above nominal levels. Although
relays are configured to pickup at levels above nominal currents, overload and inrush
currents must be permitted for a certain duration before a line is tripped.
The second reason is a consequence of the coordination of different relays. When
a fault occurs, the relays and circuit breakers that are the closest to the fault (where
fault currents are highest) operate and disconnect the faulted area. Modern relays
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trigger circuit breakers within one cycle. If a fault persists beyond a certain duration
(because of a relay or breaker failure), backup relays trigger additional circuit breakers
and remove power from an area wider than initially intended. Relay coordination is
typically achieved using several protection zones, each activated with a different time
delay. In the coordination example shown in Figure 10, a fault in Zone 1 causes the
focused distance relay to operate the associated circuit breaker after one cycle. If a
fault occurs in Zone 2 or Zone 3, the focused relay is no longer the closest one to
the fault, and it is delayed to allow appropriate relays and circuit breakers to operate
first; in this particular case, the focused relay acts as a backup relay.
~ ~
1
2
3
Zone 1, delay: 1 cycle
Zone 2, delay: 15 cycles
Zone 3, delay: 30 cycles
Circuit breaker
(with distance relay)
Generator ~
Focused 
distance relay 
and breaker
Figure 10: Example of distance relay application with three protection zones.
If backup relays were to trip instantaneously, large portions of the system would
be unnecessarily disconnected every time there is a fault. This is especially true for
distribution systems that usually have a radial structure. Therefore, backup relays
(and breakers protecting Zones 2 and 3 of transmission lines) normally have a longer
response time (15–30 cycles) than relays directly surrounding the fault. One exception
to this rule is when backup breakers have higher ratings than first-zone breakers. In
such cases, if the first-zone breaker is overdutied, backup breakers should be triggered
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first to avoid breaker failures and common-mode outages.
The third reason is the time it takes to actually operate relays and clear faults.
With major relay manufacturers, instantaneous relay operation implies operation
within one cycle. Half a cycle is the typical minimum relay response time used in
IEEE standards and by utilities [37, 88, 89]. In numerical relays, such a response time
is needed to obtain an adequate sample of fault currents before the current RMS can
be computed. The relay response time and the contact parting time of the circuit
breakers create a cumulative delay of one to a few cycles before arcing and current
interruption actually start. In contrast, the initial rise of fault currents takes less
than half a cycle. After this rise, the RMS value of fault currents obeys Equation (4)
until fault conditions are cleared.
It results that clearing faults within the first half-cycle of a fault for the purpose of
“benefiting” from reduced fault currents is not possible with the equipment presently
available. Finally, although arcs should be extinguished at the zero current crossing
immediately following the parting of the breaker contacts, the whole arc quenching
process may take a few additional cycles. The timing and order of the different steps
to clear a fault are synthesized in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Sequence and timing to clear a fault (modified from IEEE C37.04 [40]).
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To summarize, it is not practically possible to operate circuit breakers and clear
faults at the exact instant they occur. Relay margins and coordination prevent the
arc quenching process from starting (and completing) before short-circuit currents
largely exceed nominal currents.
3.3.4 Testing of Numerical Relays and Phasor Measurement Units
Relay testing is relevant to preserving circuit breaker adequacy because it is an op-
portunity to ensure, through offline simulations, that overstressed breakers are not
operated beyond their interrupting capability.
More generally, numerical relay testing is important to track unexpected relay
responses to certain power system events. Relay misoperations were the initiating
circumstances of two recent blackouts [90, 91]. Besides, utilities have developed an
interest in testing relays and protection schemes against various power system events
or transients. Moreover, the compatibility and interoperability of relays from multiple
vendors can be assessed during these tests. In addition to transient testing, there is a
growing interest in testing the measurement and timing accuracy of GPS-synchronized
equipment (relays and phasor measurement units).
3.3.4.1 Principle
The principle of a relay test is as follows: a fault, voltage sag, frequency drift, or any
other transient phenomenon is simulated; the corresponding potential transformer
(PT) voltages and current transformer (CT) currents are recreated and fed to the
tested relay; finally, the response of the relay or the accuracy of the tested PMU is
analyzed (Figure 12).
Commercial products can perform a predetermined palette of tests. In addition,
laboratory experiments are being developed to improve the accuracy and the scope of
such tests. For instance, timing accuracy is obtained using waveform generators with
high-precision clocks [92]. Waveform accuracy is achieved by simulating three-phase,
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physical power system models that include all circuit breakers and instrumentation
devices; the quadratic integration method further improves the accuracy of time-
domain waveforms [93]. Waveforms that reflect field conditions can also be obtained
using scaled models of power systems, where imbalances and power quality issues can
be reproduced and tested [94, 95]. With present testing equipment, high levels of
power system fidelity can be achieved to respond to the specific relay testing needs
from utilities and system operators.
Figure 12: Relay testing workflow.
3.3.4.2 Transient Testing of Protection Schemes
Approaches have been investigated by IEEE and PSERC researchers to provide a uni-
fied relay testing methodology that transcends the differences in setup and function-
ality between relays from different manufacturers [96]. Transient testing of protective
relays generally relies on the following methodology:
• A reference test system (for example, a model of the local bulk transmission
system) is designed to simulate the events and transients of interest.
• Benchmark scenarios that target the functions that are common to the tested
relays are drafted. The scenarios include simulated events and recorded data
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from actual transients. The expected responses of the tested relays to these
events are compiled.
• Using a programmable voltage and current source, transient waveforms are
played and sent to the tested relays.
• The responses of the relays to the transient waveforms are collected for analysis.
As suggested in Figure 12, a significant hardware platform (a commercial relay
testing device or a waveform generator built from scratch) is required to recreate
the CT currents and PT voltages for the relay inputs. Specifically, voltages and
currents are simulated on a computer, then converted into 115 V/5 A signals through
D/A converters and amplifying equipment. The limited number of channels available
and the range of the generated voltages and currents are challenges that restrict the
spectrum of the tests that can be conducted.
On the other hand, since modern relays are computer-based, virtual relay testing
can be performed on a host PC without a hardware platform (Figure 13). Measure-
ment inputs and relay outputs are processed as the simulation runs. Feedback is
provided in real-time to help identify discrepancies in protection schemes.
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Figure 13: Principle of virtual relay testing.
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Virtual relay testing relies on the ability to send configuration and waveform data
to the relay firmware directly without using PT or CT circuits. The events and
outputs of the tested relay can be processed directly as well. A documented interface
[97] is needed for different parties to understand how waveform data and tap settings
are used within the tested relay firmware. Such tests are technically possible but
require close cooperation with relay manufacturers. Moreover, with the knowledge of
the interface parameters of relay binaries from multiple vendors, the computer running
the tests can dispatch a single input to the different relays using the formats accepted
by each relay function. As a result, virtual relay testing eliminates the constraints of
a hardware setup, including waveform generation, wiring, and communications. By
removing the restrictions on the possible range of tests, virtual relay testing opens
opportunities for advanced relay testing techniques. An open system approach would
allow utilities, universities, and manufacturers to collaborate and improve the state
of the knowledge in protective relaying [98, 99, 100].
3.3.4.3 PMU Measurement and Timing Accuracy Testing
The measurement and timing accuracy of relays and PMUs are critical to successful
state estimation and postmortem event analysis. Indeed, the time for an event to
propagate to PMUs scattered across an electric network may result in measurements
shifted by several degrees at 60 Hz. PMUs improve the ability to find the signature
of the same event from waveforms recorded at different locations. To determine the
measurement and timing accuracy of relays and PMUs, a reference waveform is sent
to those devices, and the measurements retrieved from the devices are compared to
the reference waveform. Drifts in magnitude, frequency, and timing are tabulated.
The accuracy and interoperability of PMUs are subject to the IEEE Standard
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for Synchrophasors for Power Systems [101]. In addition, the North American Syn-
chroPhasor Initiative (formerly Eastern Interconnection Phasor Project) has com-
pleted (a) a test guide to unify PMU testing [102], including proper time-stamp as-
signment and (b) a guide for assessing the accuracy of synchrophasor measurements
[103]. The testing procedures described are under implementation at NIST and at
the Georgia Institute of Technology [92, 104].
The objective for these tests is to obtain phasor measurements with an ideal
accuracy of 0.1% in magnitude and 0.01◦ in phase angle (0.5 µs at 60 Hz).
3.4 Fault Current Limiters
Fault current limiters (FCLs) are variable-impedance devices with two states: the de-
fault, “permissive” state (low, transparent device impedance) and the “limiting” state
(increased device impedance under fault conditions). With their variable impedance,
fault current limiters can
• limit fault currents in circuits that are not rated to carry the full fault current,
• limit the duty of circuit breakers to allow reliable breaker operation, and
• divert currents in excess of the rating of a line to neighboring lines.
The impedance of a fault current limiter can be increased in several ways. Explo-
sives and fuses were used in early limiters to abruptly open or change the impedance
of the circuits. Modern limiters are based on superconductors and/or semiconductors.
In high-temperature superconductors, the temperature and impedance increase with
the current [105]. (The upper limit for superconductivity is −173 ◦C.) In contrast,
semiconductor current limiters are activated by the output of a relay and transfer the
current to a high-impedance shunt device. Fault current limiters exist for voltages up
to 500 kV [106].
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Fault current limiters are praised for their ability to improve electric power quality
and system stability [107]. They can mitigate the increase of fault currents resulting
from distributed generation while delaying the need to replace overdutied circuit
breakers. The greatest need for FCLs is in dense and highly interconnected systems,
such as the Japanese grid [108].
Newly installed equipment must not compromise power systems reliability. Spe-
cific precautions must be taken when equipping lines with fault current limiters. First,
to avoid exceeding breaker ratings, FCLs must bring the highest possible fault cur-
rents below the ratings of potentially overstressed breakers. The situation where fault
currents remain above the ratings of the breakers after FCL operation is known as
“overshooting” [109]. The second precaution is to ensure proper coordination of FCLs
with protective relays [110, 111, 112]. FCLs affect three factors of power systems
protection: (i) the magnitude of stresses, (ii) the timing of the protection (FCLs may
operate faster than relays), and (iii) the phase angle of fault currents [113].
The last precaution relates to the automatic reclosing of circuit breakers. Since
many faults are transient rather than permanent, relays often attempt to open and
reclose circuits several times within the seconds following a fault. To avoid inter-
ferences with existing protection schemes, FCLs must return to the permissive state
before circuit breakers reclose. Although semiconductor-based FCLs can switch to
the permissive state instantly, superconductor-based FCLs take a few minutes to cool
down and cannot operate until they reach the superconductive state again [105].
The characteristic conditions resulting from the operation of FCLs must be de-
tected and treated as fault conditions. Indeed, protection schemes may not respond
to certain low residual fault current levels, and residual fault current levels can still
generate dangerous ground potential rises.
Fault current limiter technology is still under development. With costs expected to
decline, FCLs are to become widespread and improve the operations of power systems.
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Prioritized FCL deployments can be determined from the methodology proposed in
this study to relieve the operations of the most overstressed breakers. The expected
improvements in power system operations earned fault current limiters the reputation
of “Holy Grail” [105] devices.
3.5 Bus and Substation Protection
In substations, circuit breakers are arranged in a way that allows taking a single
line out of service without disconnecting other lines. Protection and instrumentation
equipment are also present on the substation premises. Substations constitute the
nodes of the transmission system.
Most high-voltage substations are outdoor substations, such as the one visible in
the background of Figure 6. Indoor substations are less common and support lower
voltage levels than outdoor substations.
In certain substation configurations, fault currents can flow from one point to the
other through multiple paths. Each path receives a fraction of the total current drawn
by the fault. The topology of circuit breakers and lines in a substation dictates the
range of fault currents the breakers must interrupt. Indeed, unlike breakers devoted
to the protection of a single line, breakers that are part of a substation ring bus or
a transfer bus must be able to interrupt the highest fault current on any of the lines
connected to that substation [114]. Therefore, substation topologies affect circuit
breaker adequacy and reliability.
3.5.1 Types of Arrangements
Circuit breakers are arranged to provide connectivity between lines and the abil-
ity to isolate one or several lines independently from the rest of the system. Many
breaker arrangements also allow at least one breaker to be out of service while main-
taining full connectivity between any two points within the substation. The typical
substation breaker arrangements that can be combined to achieve connectivity are
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single-breaker, transfer buses, ring, double-bus-double-breaker, breaker-and-a-half ar-
rangements [114] (Figure 14).
3.5.2 Advantages and Drawbacks
Each of the substation breaker arrangements presented in Figure 14 has advantages
and disadvantages in terms of maintenance flexibility, construction cost, and path
redundancy. The number of breakers per line determines the construction cost of the
substation. The number of breakers needed to open a line determines whether fault
currents from a line are divided between one or several paths within the substation;
multiple breakers that protect the same line guarantee the redundancy of its supply.
The outage allowance is the highest number of breakers that can be open or with-
drawn for maintenance while maintaining full substation connectivity. The number
of breakers per line, the number of breakers to open a line, and the outage allowances
for each bus-breaker arrangement shown in Figure 14 are listed in Table 8.
Table 8: Comparative characteristics of bus-breaker arrangements.
Arrangement Breakers/Line Breakers to Open Line Outage Allowance
Single-breaker 1 1 0 breaker
Transfer bus 1 + 1/nLines
a 1 1 breaker
Ring 1 2 1 breaker
Double-breaker 2 2 50% of breakers
Breaker-and-a-half 1.5 2 33% of breakers
anLines being the number of lines connected to the considered group of breakers.
The ring bus and the breaker-and-a-half arrangements are common because they
balance the number of breakers per line with the outage allowance while maintaining
a redundancy of the line connections. These bus arrangements cost less than double-
breaker arrangements but retain the benefits of redundant connection. In terms of
reliability, ring and breaker-and-a-half arrangements support N−1 contingencies with
at least two degrees of freedom (two routes to supply any transmission line).
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Figure 14: Illustration of typical substation breaker arrangements.
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3.6 Summary
Functional descriptions of circuit breakers, protective relays, and fault current limiters
are provided in this chapter. Each device plays a protective role and affects the duty
and reliability of circuit breakers. Their role and limitations must be considered when
designing and testing protection schemes.
Circuit breakers are central to power systems protection because they ultimately
interrupt fault currents and protect other equipment against the mechanical and ther-
mal stresses caused by high fault currents. The different parts of a circuit breaker
participate in the different stages of fault interruption: relay-breaker links must trans-
mit all relay trip signals to breaker trip mechanisms; trip mechanisms ensure that the
contacts of the breakers open as fast as possible while avoiding unnecessary wear on
mechanical parts; mechanical parts, in contrast, must endure open-close sequences as
specified in circuit breaker standards; not least, breaker plates accelerate arc extinc-
tion and maintain dielectric insulation once the breaker contacts are open.
The ratings and reliability of circuit breakers are determined by the design char-
acteristics of the different breaker components. Thus, interrupting fault currents that
exceed the capabilities of circuit breakers is unsafe and should be avoided because
of the increased risk of breaker failures, associated common-mode outages in other
parts of the system, and the accelerated aging of the breakers that may jeopardize
pre-established maintenance plans. The role played by each of the breaker compo-
nents is integrated into a Markov chain model of circuit breakers that is based on
the reliability models of the individual breaker components. This Markov model is
developed in Chapter 5 and serves as the base to build a lifetime model of circuit
breakers.
Around circuit breakers are relays that sense and react to fault conditions. Future
relay applications should account for circuit breaker ratings; appropriate protection
strategies should address events where a breaker does not have a sufficient rating to
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interrupt a given short-circuit current. Fault current limiters and substation config-
urations come as an aid to reduce the duties of overstressed breakers and to control
the flow of fault currents through all the substation paths. In Chapter 6, several
strategies are investigated, where substation topologies, breaker switching sequences,
and fault current limiters contribute to the control of the fault duty of overstressed
breakers.
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CHAPTER IV
REVIEW OF EXISTING KNOWLEDGE AND
PRACTICES
4.1 Overview
The objective of this chapter is to review existing practices and works as relate to
circuit breaker monitoring and fault duty management. Managing breaker duties,
especially in distribution systems with distributed generation, and monitoring breaker
status to detect early performance degradation and signs of failure, appear as keys to
improving circuit breaker operational reliability.
This chapter is divided in several parts that deal with
• on-site circuit breaker duty and wear monitoring,
• circuit breaker maintenance practices,
• existing strategies to circumvent circuit breaker overstress,
• applications of breaker-oriented network models,
• statistical estimation of circuit breaker fault duty, and
• protection of distribution systems with distributed generation.
4.2 Impact of Distributed Generation on the Protection of
Distribution Systems
4.2.1 About Distribution Systems
Distribution systems are the part of power systems that link customer loads to the
hubs and substations of transmission systems. While transmission systems generally
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connect main generation and load centers over long distances, distribution systems
have a much finer layout than transmission systems to serve all customers of a par-
ticular area.
Most distribution networks have a radial structure (Figure 15) that originates at
a transmission substation and has ramifications to all customer loads of the serviced
area. Although two branches of a distribution system may be interconnected at
specific locations to form a mesh (using tie switches), meshed distribution networks
are less common than radial distribution networks [115, 116].
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Figure 15: The IEEE 34-bus radial distribution test system [117].
In the absence of distributed generation, the knowledge of the different sections
of a radial distribution system is sufficient to conduct fault analysis and to design
protection schemes. In radial distribution systems, fault analysis and protection co-
ordination are relatively simple because the current flows in a single direction, from
the transmission substation to the branches and load centers. For each node in a
radial system, there is an upstream (towards the substation) and a downstream di-
rection (away from the substation). Since power flows away from substations, there
are no power exchanges between the different branches of a distribution system (no
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“cross-branch” flow). Meshed distribution systems are less common than radial distri-
bution systems; upstream and downstream directions still exist in meshed distribution
systems but are determined by loads and fault characteristics.
4.2.2 Distributed Generation and Distribution Systems Protection
Distributed generation is most often found in distribution systems for the proximity
to customers (medium and low voltage levels). Although transmission substations
provide most of the power carried in distribution systems, distributed sources account
for an increasing portion of the power supplied to the loads from within distribution
systems.
Several authors have reported that distributed generation (DG) impacts fault
analysis and protective relay coordination [7, 115] in distribution networks. The
reason for this impact is that the presence of generators in a distribution system blurs
the upstream/downstream concept. Distributed generation affects the magnitude and
direction of fault currents in certain sections of distribution systems, and protection
schemes must be adjusted to account for these changes.
Distributed sources can be viewed in two ways: as small generators compared to
the plants that supply most of the power to the distribution network considered, and
as primary power sources for the loads at proximity of distributed sources.
The fault current contribution from DG must be compared to fault currents
brought by the parent transmission system. On one hand, DG can significantly
contribute to fault currents in remote portions of a distribution network, in which
case protection schemes must be adjusted to treat such current levels as faults. On
the other hand, if DG is located near the origin of a substation feeder, the contri-
bution of DG to fault currents may be small compared to the contribution from the
transmission system.
Fault currents drawn by DG must be detected in all cases, however, because
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(i) isolating the distribution system from the transmission network alone does not
completely isolate faults as DG may still feeding them, and (ii) some utilities require
DG sources to be shut down or disconnected from distribution systems during faults.
4.2.3 Typical Protection Procedures and Issues in Systems with Dis-
tributed Generation
To avoid electrocution hazards to utility crew operating on electrical installations,
DG systems are disconnected or shut down during faults or repairs to distribution
networks. Islanded operation is generally not allowed without prior utility approval.
Disabling DG during faults seems to defeat one key benefit of DG, which is to
provide power and voltage support following a power system event. Disconnecting DG
systems from the main distribution system presents the other drawback of requiring
a synchronism check when reconnecting a DG system operated as an island.
The full disconnection of DG in a radial distribution system during a fault means
that all loads downstream of the breaker that clears the fault is left without power. A
tie connection is necessary to enable DG during a fault without islanding and needing
to check for synchronism. Distribution systems protection issues are best understood
graphically with the aid of Figure 16.
To maintain DG during a fault and continue supplying power to most customers,
the principle of the loop has been utilized [115, 118]. When a fault occurs, the
supervisory system attempts to establish a loop by closing a tie switch that connects
the faulted branch to another part of the distribution system. With the loop in place,
at least two breakers are needed to isolate the faulted section of the distribution
network. The rest of the distribution network outside of these two breakers is not
affected by fault isolation and can continue operation with DG enabled.
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Figure 16: Effect of distributed generation in the protection of distribution systems.
4.3 Circuit Breaker Reliability Analysis and Lifetime Man-
agement
4.3.1 Circuit Breaker Reliability Models and Applications
Several circuit breaker reliability models are related to this study. These models
attempt to predict breaker failure and maintenance based on operational and main-
tenance data of the different parts of a circuit breakers.
One circuit breaker reliability model [119] predicts the age-related failures of sev-
eral breaker components: trip latch, chains, springs, auxiliary contacts for the operat-
ing mechanism, insulators, and interrupter unit. The high level of detail of the model
allows targeting reliability studies to the individual components of the breaker. Based
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on limited, general breaker failure statistics (fraction of breaker population that has
failed, time and number of operations to failure), the failure rates of the individual
components of the breaker are calculated.
The second model [120] is a probabilistic maintenance model that predicts the
probability of breaker failures based on the performance findings from maintenance
operations. Breaker maintenance is performed based on the condition of the different
parts of a circuit breaker. The condition of the breaker components is monitored by
a palette of inspection tests. The results of these inspection tests conducted prior to
maintenance are utilized to compute a component failure rate and to decide on the
type of maintenance that should be performed (from light cleaning of the components
to a complete breaker replacement). The type of maintenance performed is partly
based on failure costs compared to the costs of actually performing the maintenance.
This second model is hence a maintenance-based reliability model.
The third model [121] is a multi-state Markov model of circuit breakers geared
towards preventive breaker maintenance. As with the second model, the Markov
chain described models the transitions of a particular breaker from states that do not
require preventive maintenance to states that require maintenance. In this model, a
number of power systems events are simulated, and contingencies are ranked based
on the failure probabilities found for each breaker according to maintenance practices
for the considered breakers.
The approach taken in these models is opposite of the approach of this study, which
is to predict breaker failures based on individual component failure rates. Nonetheless,
the theoretical concepts used in these breaker models are also used in the proposed
breaker reliability model that includes the effect of increased fault stresses.
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4.3.2 Circuit Breaker Duty and Wear Monitoring
The adequacy of a circuit breaker is typically evaluated using worst-case scenarios,
for instance, by comparing its rating to the maximum currents contributed by three-
phase faults in the studied system [122, 123, 124]. (Three-phase faults are usually
more severe than faults of other types.)
Although worst-case scenarios provide an absolute measure of the adequacy of cir-
cuit breakers, they do not necessarily reflect the currents that are actually interrupted
during the service life of a particular breaker. While interrupting worst-case fault cur-
rents may cause immediate breaker failures, wear and tear primarily originates from
clearing faults that are not as severe as worst-case faults.
The distinction between worst-case and actual fault conditions is important be-
cause actual conditions can be monitored and tracked by numerical relays [74, 125],
and fault statistics can be built upon the recorded fault data.
Several circuit breaker monitoring functions already exist in numerical relays, such
as tracking the circuit breaker duty, counting of the number of operations, and issuing
alarms when the fault clearing time exceeds a preset value. The monitoring functions
are implemented using sensor data, including electrical and mechanical quantities. In
addition to the voltages and currents of interest, sensor data may contain additional
information about the mechanical or chemical condition of the circuit breaker. For
instance, the coil current of a breaker carries information about the condition of its
trip mechanism [126]. Other relevant data include travel time, gas pressure, fluid
levels, and measurements of the dielectric strength of the insulators.
The authors of the papers cited in the paragraphs above mention a number of
implementation challenges such as knowing the design, the rating, and the history of
currents interrupted. With little to no data available from utilities, the estimates of
the statistical distribution of fault current magnitudes proposed in this study are an
aid to monitor circuit breaker duty and wear.
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4.3.3 Endurance Testing and Modeling
Investigative tests that target the mechanics and insulation of circuit breakers have
been completed and documented [127, 128]. Generally, the properties of the contacts,
mechanical support, and insulation change slightly after each breaker operation, de-
pending on the severity of the fault. Degradation of the breaker components occurs
as these changes are cumulated over time.
In one model, the remaining lifetime of a circuit breaker is estimated by categoriz-
ing fault currents into different ranges (e.g. 50%, 75%, and 100% of the rating of the
breaker) and by determining the equivalent contact erosion for each range of currents
[127, 128, 129]. In another model, circuit breaker wear is based on a set number
of operations above which breaker failure rates increase. Each breaker operation is
treated as a “shock,” which intensity depends on the severity of the interrupted fault.
Every shock results in some random wear of the operated breaker [130].
One common aspect of the endurance models above is the consideration of a lim-
ited range of fault current values or a limited number of faults. Such limitations
reduce the viability of the estimates of circuit breaker wear. Wear predictions can be
improved using statistical estimates of the expected stresses through each breaker.
Probabilistic distributions of fault current magnitudes for each circuit breaker can
be estimated using a system-level fault analysis methodology that includes the most
common types of faults. This methodology is developed in Chapter 5. Such distribu-
tions quantify the likelihood of the different levels of stresses that may apply to the
given breaker at the time of operation.
4.3.4 Maintenance Strategies and Failure Prevention
There are four alternatives when dealing with equipment reaching the end of its
initial service life: lifetime exhaustion (“use-it-up”, “run-to-failure”), retrofitting, re-
conditioning, and replacement [131, 132] (Table 9). The total ownership costs of each
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alternative (including depreciation, maintenance costs, penalties for unavailability,
etc.) and the costs associated with the desired performance of the considered circuit
breakers determine which alternative is selected by each utility.
Table 9: Description of key equipment usage patterns.
Usage Pattern Description Cost
Use-up The entire service life of the considered equipment is
exhausted. The equipment is used until frequent fail-
ures become a logistical and financial obstacle to regu-
lar operation and maintenance. This pattern typically
applies to obsolete equipment.
Lowest
Retrofit The considered devices are modernized and upgraded
with enhanced ratings, functions, and reliability.
Compatibility is maintained with the equipment coun-
terparts that have not been retrofitted.
High
Re-conditioning The considered equipment is brought to its “as new”
state with the repair or replacement of most of its
parts. Parts must be available for re-conditioning
to take place. Although performance is restored to
its original point, no additional function, reliabil-
ity, or performance improvements occur during re-
conditioning.
Low
Replacement New equipment is purchased to meet new performance
levels or design standards. A redesign of the interface
between the new breakers and the existing substation
equipment may be necessary.
Highest
In 1999, a survey on the impact of maintenance on the reliability of power systems
investigated the implementation of how four key maintenance strategies at different
utilities worldwide [133] (Table 10). The most common maintenance strategies are
(a) scheduled maintenance programs at fixed intervals and (b) empirical predictive
maintenance based on condition monitoring. It is noted that maintenance increases
the lifetime of a device only if failures occur as a result of a deterioration or aging
process. Maintenance against random failures does not improve the expected device
lifetime, however.
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Table 10: Description of key equipment maintenance strategies.
Maintenance Type Description Usage
Scheduled
(preventive)
Maintenance is performed at regular, fixed in-
tervals, regardless of the deterioration state of
the equipment.
Extensive
Predictive
(as needed)
Field observations and condition monitoring
are carried out regularly. Maintenance is per-
formed if certain criteria from the field obser-
vations are met.
Extensive
Reliability-centered
maintenance (RCM)
Maintenance is performed with priority given
to activities that benefit to the reliability of
the system at the most effective cost. Crite-
ria for RCM implementation may vary with
utilities.
Emerging
Probabilistic mainte-
nance
Reliability indices are computed based on
mathematical models of the power system op-
erations. Maintenance is undertaken as a re-
sult of the comparison of different reliability
indices.
Emerging
The authors of the survey stress that scheduled maintenance and empirical pre-
dictive maintenance are inherently ineffective despite being popular. Specifically, the
scheduled and empirical strategies may result in maintenance performed more fre-
quently than actually needed. Thus, these maintenance strategies prevent utilities
from fully exploiting the “lifetime potential” of their equipment and from allocating
maintenance resources where it is really needed. In addition, the authors of the sur-
vey point that unnecessary maintenance exposes the internal components of circuit
breakers to additional human errors and may actually increase breaker failures.
Probabilistic maintenance models based on mathematical lifetime estimations
have the potential to predict failure more accurately than in condition-based mainte-
nance and without the risk of human error. Despite the advantage of accuracy, these
models require historical data that are not always available. According to the cited
survey, such mathematical models have still not been used to a significant extent.
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The fact that probabilistic models have not been widely used suggests that the fo-
cus of the most common maintenance strategies is not on maintaining the adequacy
of circuit breakers. New maintenance strategies should emphasize circuit breaker
adequacy and be based on probabilistic maintenance models. Indeed, probabilistic
models allow factoring historical fault data into future trends, and statistical fault
analyses are needed to account for the evolution of circuit breaker adequacy. Statisti-
cal fault data are not accounted for in the fixed and as-needed maintenance routines.
On the other hand, the statistical data can be accommodated in probabilistic models
and be used to compute reliability indices for the reliability-centered maintenance
(RCM) strategy. A probabilistic model to evaluate circuit breaker adequacy is devel-
oped in Chapter 5.
4.3.5 Maintenance and Lifetime Models
4.3.5.1 Maintenance Models
The goal of maintenance models is to schedule maintenance as to maximize uptime
while maintaining desired equipment reliability at the lowest cost and with the re-
sources available. Therefore, there is an important economical emphasis in mainte-
nance models.
Increases in fault duties caused by the growth of generation capacity may shorten
the time between maintenance operations. Rising fault current levels are presently not
considered in long-term maintenance schedules. Indeed, circuit breaker maintenance
is not performed based on the cumulated interrupting duty over the service life of the
breakers, and there are no known references of maintenance strategies that anticipate
an increase of fault duties as a result of the expansion of the generating capacity.
4.3.5.2 Estimation of Loss of Life
Loss-of-life (LOL) estimation is commonly performed on transformers [134]. Trans-
former protection relays from major manufacturers calculate the LOL by monitoring
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the transformer load. Transformer relays may also shed load if the estimated loss of
life adversely affects transformer reliability. Specifically, it is established that the life
of the insulation of a transformer is drastically shortened above 110 ◦C [135].
Stresses make the difference and the similarity between circuit breakers and trans-
formers. On one hand, breakers operate a few times per year, whereas transformers
are continuously loaded. On the other hand, transformers are overloaded on purpose
to save copper (typically at 1.5 times the rated apparent power), whereas breaker
overstress is generally unintended.
4.4 Existing Strategies around Circuit Breaker Inadequacy
Replacing overdutied circuit breakers in a short time window is not possible econom-
ically and from a manufacturing standpoint. As a result, a number of overdutied
circuit breakers must remain in operation. Different ways to circumvent breaker ade-
quacy issues are suggested in papers that describe the experience of utilities [123] and
industrial customers [9, 10, 136, 137]. The suggested solutions with their advantages
and drawbacks are listed in Table 11.
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Table 11: Possible Strategies to Circumvent Overdutied Breaker Issues.
Strategy Advantages Drawbacks
Replacement Durably mitigates the prob-
lem.
Expensive, long-term invest-
ment.
Swap Uses existing equipment. Labor-intensive; limited bene-
fits.
Fault current lim-
iters and current
limiting reactors
Mitigates the problem. Technology not mature yet.
Use of reactors Reduces fault current. Prevents efficient motor
startup; some voltages may
drop. Qualified as “band-aid”
solution by some authors
[137].
System/substation
reconfiguration
Uses flexibility of existing sub-
station or system.
Not a permanent solution; re-
quires a flexible infrastruc-
ture.
Selective current
tripping and zone
interlocking
Uses existing breakers to clear
most faults; uses highly rated
backup breakers for faults that
overdutied breakers cannot in-
terrupt.
Adequate backup protection,
relay communication, and re-
lay coordination required for
currents above breaker rating.
Delayed relay op-
eration
DC offset neglected. Tests of new protection
scheme necessary.
Sequential trip-
ping
Reduces fault current through
overdutied breaker one contri-
bution at a time.
Power removed from an area
wider than intended.
Area auto-reclose
cycle
Allows overdutied breakers to
open safely while surrounding
breakers temporarily remove
power.
Adversely affects power qual-
ity in a large area.
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4.5 Uses of Breaker-Oriented Power System Models
4.5.1 Overview
Substation breakers are assumed closed and are omitted in many power flow and
short-circuit computations (Figure 3 in Chapter 2). Models that do not include
circuit breakers and substation topologies are said to be bus-oriented.
In contrast, breaker-oriented power system models explicitly represent breaker
arrangements inside substations. Breaker-oriented models make power flow and fault
analysis possible for any breaker in the studied system. Such models are necessary to
accurately check the duties of individual circuit breakers [114] because possible fault
currents may vary from one location to another within the same substation depending
on which breakers are open or closed. An example to illustrate the differences between
the bus-oriented and the breaker-oriented modeling approaches is shown in Figure 17.
1 2
BUSB XFMR-L
1 2
Substation B
SUBB-L1
SUBB-L3
NORTHBUS
SUBB-L2
SOUTHBUS
SUBB-TR XFMR-L
(a) (b)
Figure 17: Illustrative comparison between the (a) bus-oriented and (b) breaker-
oriented modeling approach.
Bulk power system models with explicit substation breaker arrangements have
been introduced with the 1996 definition of the IEEE Reliability Test System [30].
Although breaker arrangements have been integrated to this test system, no compre-
hensive implementations and applications of three-phase, breaker-oriented reliability
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test systems have been widely distributed prior to the system proposed in Chapter 7.
Breaker-oriented network models have not been widely used because the con-
version of substations from single nodes to groups of multiple nodes dramatically
increases the size of the modeled power systems. Additional state variables (one state
per breaker) are needed to compute the power flow through each circuit breaker in
the model. Nonetheless, the memory and speed of the latest computers suits the
requirements of such detailed power system models, and recent work has called for
an adoption of breaker-oriented models in several aspects of power systems analy-
sis. Specifically, the need for a reference three-phase, breaker-oriented system such
as the one proposed in Chapter 7 has arisen from the modeling capabilities of recent
computer programs.
4.5.2 State Estimation Applications
State estimation consists of determining the voltage (magnitude and angle) at every
bus of an electric network by using a set of redundant measurements. One aspect
of the state estimation process is to identify bad measurements (outliers) and what
caused such measurements to be impaired. Errors on circuit breaker status (breaker
status not correctly reported by a relay) affect load flow estimates. Such errors can
have consequences in protection schemes when the estimated currents contradict the
measurements. Such errors can also make operators think that the operation of a
power system in a certain range is possible when some operating limits are, in fact,
exceeded.
4.5.2.1 Circuit Breaker Status Error Detection
Circuit breakers that are unexpectedly open or closed cause discrepancies between
measurements and the results of state estimation [138, 139, 140]. With erroneous
breaker states, state estimation is performed using a wrong system topology. Typical
examples involve lines that are unexpectedly disconnected or substations that are
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split into two entities from an electrical standpoint. In such cases, state estimation is
performed on the wrong assumptions that substations are still a single entity or that
the disconnected lines are still connected to the system (Figure 18).
Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 4Line 2 Line 3 Line 4Line 1
Load Load
Breaker States in State Estimator Actual Breaker States
Breaker Status Error
Bus Topology in State Estimator: 
Substation as a Single Entity
Actual Bus Topology:
Substation as Two Separate Entities
Line 2Line 1
Load Line 3 Line 4
Load Line 3
Line 2Line 1
Line 4
Breaker (closed)
Breaker (open)
Substation Topology Error
Figure 18: Example of a circuit breaker status error and its implication in substation
topology.
The use of the breaker-oriented approach to model substations with frequent mea-
surement errors has been recommended to address circuit breaker status errors. In
these recommendations, state estimation is first performed using the bus-oriented
models; the breaker-oriented model is applied thereafter to refine the estimated states
at selected substations as needed [138, 141, 142]. The proposed breaker-oriented mod-
eling approach may apply to a single substation at a time or to multiple substations
together to identify circuit breaker status errors in a systematic fashion.
Wrong assumptions on circuit breaker states cause state estimation errors. These
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errors demonstrate the inability, by using bus-oriented models, to quantify the impact
of different substation topologies on power flow and state estimation. The authors
of the cited works show that the detection of breaker status errors can be improved
using breaker-oriented substation models. They also note that the lack of circuit
breaker monitoring is a factor that increases the incidence of breaker status errors.
These errors may be reduced with the monitoring and communications capabilities
found in advanced relays and integrated substation computer systems.
4.5.2.2 Explicit Substation Breaker Modeling and the SuperCalibrator Concept
Accuracy is a key aspect of modern power systems models and algorithms. The
performance of modern substation automation systems is tied to the precision of the
simulated data and the fidelity of the models.
The SuperCalibrator is an accuracy-driven, distributed state estimator that fits
GPS-synchronized measurements into a detailed, comprehensive system model. Be-
sides state estimation, the SuperCalibrator facilitates the detection of topology errors
and enables distributed alarm processing. This section highlights key facts of the
SuperCalibrator concept [143, 23, 144] as relate to applications of explicit breaker
arrangement models in substations.
The accuracy of the SuperCalibrator is achieved in several ways. First, the Su-
perCalibrator concept takes advantage of modern phasor measurement units (PMU)
that measure complex voltage and current phasors. Spcifically, each substation must
provide at least one GPS-synchronized measurement with a magnitude accuracy of
0.1% and a time accuracy of 1 µs or 0.02◦. The accuracy achieved in GPS clocks al-
lows the synchronization of all phasors to the same time reference before performing
state estimation. Second, the measurements are fit into a detailed, realistic model
of the system that is three-phase, based on physical parameters of the devices, and
that models substation breaker layouts and instrumentation channels explicitly. With
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such an accurate network model, the systematic errors introduced by asymmetries,
switchgear, instrument transformers, and instrumentation cables and be compen-
sated, and the results of state estimation are improved.
For demonstration purposes, a laboratory scaled model of a generator substation
has been created [94, 95, 104]. The wiring of the substation model includes instru-
mentation channels and circuit breakers on all the concerned phase conductors to
allow analysis of power system events at the sensor, relay, or circuit breaker level
(Figure 19).
Circuit Breaker
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Line Disconnect Switch
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Figure 19: Detail picture of a laboratory scaled model of a substation showing
explicit wiring of circuit breakers and instrumentation channels.
Although the explicit modeling of breakers and instrumentation considerably in-
creases the size of the state vector for the entire system, the distributed aspect of the
SuperCalibrator reduces the scope of the state estimation to one particular substa-
tion and its neighboring buses. As a result, the implementation of distributed state
estimators with breaker-oriented substation models is less complex than a centralized
state estimator with the same detailed system model.
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4.6 Probabilistic Fault Analysis
Because certain substation layouts provide path redundancy, the breakers in such
substations must be rated to interrupt the highest fault current on any of the lines
connected to that substation [114].
To obtain the stresses imposed to a circuit breaker, probabilistic fault analysis
methodologies are preferred to deterministic approaches given (a) the large number
of events that otherwise need to be individually considered [145] and (b) the ran-
dom nature such events [21]. The computation of probabilistic distributions of fault
currents in power system components using Monte Carlo simulations is presented in
several papers [146, 147] and used in several works related to circuit breaker ratings
[148, 149, 150, 151].
One paper [152] also introduces the computation of the risk of breaker failure based
on the density of stresses. Specifically, the author of the paper uses the following
random parameters to determine circuit breaker reliability data: system conditions,
fault location, fault type, and fault duration. The computations of circuit breaker
failure and subsequent reliability data are further developed in this thesis.
The Monte Carlo computation of the probability density function (PDF) of fault
currents through a breaker follows the algorithm shown in Figure 20. The resulting
function is denoted w(IF ) throughout this document. A conceptual graph of such a
distribution (density and cumulative probability) is shown in Figure 21. It should be
noted that a numerical simulation yields a discretized PDF that utilizes intervals for
the different current magnitudes. For theoretical analysis, the continuous form of the
same PDF is utilized.
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Select breaker, studied area, and time horizon in test system.
For each line or cable in studied area…
For each candidate fault location…
Compute fault current through selected breaker.
Increment counter of corresponding current range.
Create ranges for current; set range counters to zero.
Normalize the distribution to obtain the
fault current probability density function.
Determine candidate fault locations for time horizon.
Figure 20: Monte Carlo algorithm for fault current probability density functions.
Fault current IF
Fault current probability density w(IF)
0
Maximum
fault current
Fault current cumulative probability cdf(IF)
11
Minimum
fault current
Fault current IF0
Maximum
fault current
Minimum
fault current
(b)(a)
Figure 21: Conceptual graphs of the fault current probability density function (a)
and cumulative probability function (b).
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The challenges highlighted in the initial publications in terms of computational
power no longer exist. Computers nowadays have enough memory for modeling de-
tailed power grids, and parallel computing with the distribution of the simulation
effort across several machines [153] is no longer a requirement. Moreover, the com-
puted fault probability density functions have been refined in subsequent papers.
4.7 Contingency Analysis
The failure of a circuit breaker results in outages that affect wide areas as a result
of the operation of backup protection. The operation of backup protection schemes
exposes backup circuit breakers to stresses that may reduce their lifetime. The loss
of two circuit breakers (N − 2 contingency) or more has more dramatic consequences
than the loss of a single breaker because additional customers lose power. Moreover,
the failure of the second (backup) breaker is conditioned by the failure of the first
breaker. (Backup breakers cannot fail if primary breakers do not fail.) In other words,
increased breaker failure probabilities augment the chances for N − 2 contingencies
to occur.
In this study, the consequences of a single breaker failure (an N − 1 contingency)
are analyzed. Advanced contingency selection and ranking methodologies for several
common-mode outages are discussed in a thesis recently completed at Georgia Tech
[41]. Contingency analysis is also conducted as part of a model for preventive breaker
maintenance [121], where several power system events involving breaker failures are
analyzed. System reliability is measured with the probability of a load connected at
a substation to be disconnected as a result of the failure of the considered breakers.
The circuit breaker reliability model developed in this thesis can be used in con-
tingency analysis. Possible future outcomes of such analyses is an assessment of
bulk power system reliability that includes the impact of distributed generation and
increased fault currents.
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter, existing circuit breaker reliability models and protection practices to
preserve circuit breaker reliability are reviewed.
Circuit breaker reliability models have been developed to schedule maintenance
based on inspection tests and condition monitoring. In addition, power system re-
liability assessments have been conducted using contingencies simulated from hypo-
thetical breaker failures.
Because increased fault currents impose additional stresses and wear to circuit
breakers, maintenance models should include failures rate contributed by such fault
currents. A methodology to obtain the contribution of fault currents to breaker
failures is developed in Chapter 5. Elements of the developed methodology such as
the Monte Carlo computation of fault statistics and the use of breaker-oriented models
(since 1996 in the IEEE 24-bus system) have already been in use, and their importance
are reemphasized in this study. The circuit breaker reliability model developed in this
thesis includes stress-induced failure rates. The model can be used in assessments of
bulk power system reliability that account for the impact of distributed generation
and increased fault currents.
Strategies to circumvent circuit breaker overstress (switching, current limiters)
have been applied on a case-by-case basis. This includes adapting protection schemes
of distribution networks that have distributed generation in service. The philosophy
of such strategies is simple and consists of avoiding the operation of breakers if their
fault currents exceed their ratings. In Chapter 6, an attempt is made to formulate
a general switching strategy for overdutied breakers and to formulate an economic
dispatch problem that accounts for circuit breaker failure rate constraints.
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CHAPTER V
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY TO PREDICT CIRCUIT
BREAKER FAILURES AND LIFETIME
5.1 Overview
Rising fault current levels exceeding breaker ratings contribute to increased circuit
breaker failures. Additional breaker failures result in additional power system outages
with extended consequences for customers. Therefore, the knowledge of the statistical
fault current levels is a pillar to assess circuit breaker adequacy. A methodology to
quantify the stress-related breaker failure probability is described in this chapter. A
quantitative assessment of circuit breaker reliability helps operating power systems
within circuit breaker interrupting capabilities.
In addition to the computation of the probability of failure of a circuit breaker
from fault current statistics (PDF), a model of the evolution of the breaker duty over
the years as power systems grow and generation capacity increases is proposed. The
fault current profile and its evolution over a certain time horizon are combined with
a model of the circuit breaker interrupting capability that reflects the interruption
history of the breakers. Together, these data are used to compute the evolution of
the stress-induced failure probability of the studied breakers on a given time horizon.
From the knowledge of the failure probabilities, estimates of the lifetime of the studied
breakers are provided.
The theory behind the proposed methodology for circuit breaker failure analysis
is described in this chapter. An illustrative application using a 24-substation test
system is provided in Chapter 7.
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5.2 Substation Breaker Fault Analysis and Adequacy As-
sessment
5.2.1 Principle
Because the current flows through multiple paths inside substation arrangements
such as breaker-and-a-half [114] (Figure 14), there are numerous scenarios for circuit
breaker fault analysis. Substation breaker fault analysis is possible using the breaker-
oriented approach described in Section 4.5.
The analysis of circuit breaker adequacy is the preliminary step to predict stress-
induced circuit breaker failures. To assess circuit breaker adequacy, breaker-oriented
models are applied in a two-step process: (i) a line flow/fault analysis is performed
without the breaker arrangements, and (ii) fault currents contributed by each line are
split between the different substation branches and breakers.
5.2.2 Three-Phase Quadratic Power Flow Formulation and Solution
The principle of the quadratic power flow (QPF) is to write all power flow equations
as a system of first and second order complex equations. The power balance is
derived from Kirchhoff’s current law for each phase at each node of the system. The
generalized QPF formulation described in this section has two advantages [93]: (i)
trigonometric functions are removed without introducing approximations, and (ii)
the Newton method converges faster with QPF equations than with Equations (1)
and (2).
The equations of device k (a transmission line, transformer, etc) in steady-state
operation (single frequency) are written in the following generalized Norton form:
External equations →
Internal equations →
 I˜k
0
 = ykeq
 V˜ k
Y˜ k
+ F


xk
T
fkeq,1 x
k
xk
T
fkeq,2 x
k
...

− bkeq. (5)
In the equation above, I˜k, V˜ k, and Y˜ k are the vectors of terminal currents, terminal
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voltages, and internal states, respectively. ykeq, b
k
eq, and f
k
eq,1 are equivalent matrices
of the proper size. F (•) denotes a purely real term. The term xk is defined as
xk =
[
Re(Xk) Im(Xk)
]
,
where the state vector X˜k is
X˜k =
 V˜ k
Y˜ k
 ← External states
← Internal states
.
The network equations consist of the Kirchhoff’s current law at each node of the
system with connectivity constraints (6) and the internal equations for all devices (7):∑
k∈{devices}
AkI˜k = 0, (6)
<Internal equations of all devices> . (7)
I˜k contains the terminal currents of device k, composed of the currents at the com-
posite nodes j1, j2, etc. A
k
i,j is a component incidence matrix, with
Aki,j =
 1 if terminal j of component k is connected to node i,0 otherwise.
With V˜ is the vector of all bus voltages, the terminal voltages of device k are
V˜ k = (Ak)T V˜ . (8)
Upon substitution of device equations and incidence equations (8), Equations (6)
and (7) become quadratic and constitute the network equations (9):
Y˜ X˜ + F


xT f1 x
xT f2 x
...

− B˜ = 0, (9)
where X˜ contains all the component states X˜k; x is the vector of network states
composed of all the component states xk; Y˜ , fi, and B˜ are matrices with appropriate
dimensions.
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The numerical algorithm for solving Equation (9) consists of two steps. First, the
network equations (9) are converted into Cartesian coordinates (real and imaginary
parts separated). The procedure is equivalent with replacing each element in Y˜ with
its corresponding 2× 2 Hermitian matrix. In particular, Y˜i,j is replaced by Re(Y˜i,j) −Im(Y˜i,j)
Im(Y˜i,j) Re(Y˜i,j)
 .
Then, Equation (9) becomes
Re(Y˜ ) x+

xT f1 x
xT f2 x
...
−Re(B˜) = 0. (10)
Equation (10) is solved using Newton’s method:
xn+1 = xn − J−1
Re(Y˜ ) xn +

xTn f1 xn
xTn f2 xn
...
−Re(B˜)
 , (11)
where xn denotes the state vector at the n
th iteration, and J is the Jacobian matrix:
J = Re(Y˜ ) +

xTn (f1 + f
T
1 )
xTn (f2 + f
T
2 )
...
 .
The convergence of the QPF algorithm is guaranteed because it is the applica-
tion of Newton’s method to a set of quadratic equations. In practice, the algorithm
summarized as Equation (11) converges in two or three iterations.
5.2.3 Breaker-Oriented Fault Analysis
Fault analyses in bus and breaker-oriented models start with the solution of a network
flow problem that corresponds to normal operation. Equation (11) is solved without
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the breaker arrangements. The solution to this network flow serves as the initial
condition for the currents through all transmission lines.
When a fault is introduced, the network model is linearized around the operat-
ing point immediately preceding the fault. With this linearization, the power flow
and currents through each transmission line of the faulted system are obtained from
pre-fault conditions in a single iteration. The assumption that generator rotor an-
gles remain constant for the expected duration of the fault makes this linearization
possible.
The topology of the considered substation is used in the second step of the substa-
tion breaker fault analysis. The current contributed by the generators and transmis-
sion lines connected at the substation is split into each branch of the substation. The
current flowing through each substation breaker is determined using the principle of
the current divider and the internal resistance of each branch of the substation.
Because the proposed fault analysis is based on a power flow solution, the com-
puted fault currents correspond to “steady-state” currents if fault conditions were to
persist indefinitely. Specifically, transients are not considered in this process, and a
separate analysis is necessary to account for transients. In particular, the DC offset
dynamics described in Section 2.5 has to be superimposed to the “steady-state” fault
currents.
5.3 Determination of Statistical Breaker Stresses
Statistical stresses are the key to quantifying the probability of failure and subsequent
reliability indices of overdutied circuit breakers. Statistical stresses are formalized
using a probability density function (PDF) of fault currents for each studied breaker.
The fault current PDF is accurately computed according to the algorithm shown
in Figure 20 in Chapter 4 using the three-phase, breaker-oriented model equations
presented in Section 5.2.
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The statistical distribution of fault currents depends on the substation topology
used and the frequency of usage. The computation of the statistical breaker stresses
consists of two parts:
1. For a specific combination of open/closed breakers in a substation (the connec-
tivity state), the expected levels of fault currents are determined.
2. The stresses are combined into a single data set using weight factors. Substation
topologies the most often used receive a high weight.
5.3.1 Initial Approach
The first approach consists of collecting the values of fault currents through the
studied breaker for faults simulated throughout an entire test system. Only single
line faults are considered in this initial approach.
Faults are distributed uniformly on each transmission lines of the studied system.
The number of faults simulated is determined by (i) the desired resolution of the
fault statistics and (ii) by the number of faults that historically occur per 100 miles
of transmission lines per year. Faults at buses are also considered to cover limit cases
of fault current levels.
The resulting fault current PDFmaps each RMS value of fault currents to a density
of probability for such current to flow through the studied breaker, considering faults
in the entire system.
5.3.2 Impact of Fault Distance to the Considered Breaker
Routine business would be hampered if all relays and breakers operated every time
there is a fault anywhere in a network. To prevent that, relays respond within a des-
ignated time frame to faults located in designated protection zones only (Figure 10).
The task and stress of clearing faults outside of these protection zones is transferred
to other breakers.
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Studied breaker
Maximum 
fault radius 
considered
Initial approach
Faults considered in the entire 
system. The studied breaker would 
operate on all faults considered.
Approach by distance
Faults simulated only within the 
considered distance from the 
breaker.
The studied breaker operates only 
on faults on these segments.
Figure 22: Selection of fault location: initial approach vs. faults within distance
from the studied breaker.
Introducing a fault radius from a breaker sets the focus to faults that are within
the operating range of that breaker and discards faults beyond the considered radius
(Figure 22). A fault radius typically covers all protection zone 1 of a breaker and may
overlap with the primary protection zone of other breakers, especially in conservative
cases. The radius can be defined as a geographical distance or as an electrical distance
(length of transmission lines or equivalent impedances) from the breaker to analyze.
Faults in the first protection zone of a breaker typically draw more current than
faults affecting lines not directly protected by the breaker. By focusing on Zone 1
faults that are more likely to contribute to breaker failure, the accuracy of fault current
statistics and the failure data of the studied breaker can be improved. In particular,
the probability density of high fault currents increases in the w(IF ) distribution. As
the fault distance is restricted, the relative weight of high fault currents increases. The
accuracy of the w(IF ) distribution can be improved by fine-tuning the fault radius as
a simulation factor.
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5.3.3 Faults by type
Line-to-ground, line-to-line, and three-phase faults do not occur with the same prob-
ability. Single-phase faults are the most common, representing 80% of the faults or
more [149]. An example of the relative frequencies of each type of faults is shown in
Table 5. The accuracy of the distribution of fault currents depends on how close the
relative statistical frequencies of the simulated faults are from reality.
To evaluate the effect of each type of fault on the breaker fault currents, a nor-
malized fault current PDF w′i(IF ) is computed for the studied breaker and for each
type of fault i = 1, . . . , nT , where nT is the number of the types of faults considered.
Each of these distributions is assigned the probability factor bi ≥ 0 from Table 5 of
the corresponding type of fault, with
nT∑
i=1
bi = 1.
Since all PDFs w′i(IF ) are normalized, the weighted sum
nT∑
i=1
biw
′
i(IF )
is also a normalized PDF. This weighted sum is precisely the fault current PDF that
accounts for all types of faults (Figure 23). Moreover, since the individual fault current
distributions for each type of faults are readily available, they are computed only once,
and the analysis translates into applying different weights to these distributions. A set
of results using different probabilities for each type of faults can be quickly generated
using this procedure.
Differences in statistical fault currents may vary when considering only one versus
several types of faults in the same test system. Such differences may affect subsequent
circuit breaker reliability indices.
82
Fault current IF
Fault current probability density w(IF)
0
Initial approach
One fault type considered (single-line-to-ground).
(a)
Fault current PDF w'i(IF) for individual fault types
Analysis by fault types
All fault types considered with specific weight.
(b)
Fault current IF0
Combined fault current PDF w(IF)
1
2
3
4
 1  +
1: Single-line-to-ground, weight: 0.8
2: Line-to-line, weight: 0.1
3: Line-to-line-to-ground, weight: 0.08
4: Three-phase, weight: 0.02
 2  +  3  + 4
Fault current IF0
Figure 23: Breaker fault PDFs: initial approach (a) vs. analysis by fault types (b).
5.3.4 Network and Substation Connectivity
The connectivity of the network and the substations (i.e. the set of lines and bus bars
that determine the possible connections in the system) determines the equivalent
impedance of the system seen from the fault location, and thus, it determines the
magnitude of fault currents. The connectivity factor is discussed assuming that the
number of generators in service remains the same.
In general, the higher the number of paths between two points of a substation,
the lower the fault levels through the breakers within each path. It results that
substation topologies are built as a compromise to provide path redundancy between
two substation points (for reliability) and keep construction costs acceptable.
5.4 Stress-Induced Breaker Failure Rates
The objective of this section is to estimate the breaker failure rate contributed by the
stress caused by intense fault currents. The stress-induced failure rates are obtained
using the fault current PDF described in Section 4.6 and using a postulated model of
breaker failure probabilities as a function of the current interrupted.
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5.4.1 Circuit Breaker Operating Current Threshold
The graph of Figure 21 illustrates a PDF of fault currents through a circuit breaker
for faults located throughout the considered system. Because all fault currents are
included regardless of fault location, this PDF is unconditional and cannot be used
as such to compute breaker failure rates. Otherwise, the given breaker operates for
every fault simulated to build the PDF, and that is clearly not the case.
An operating current threshold IOp is introduced to help identify faults associated
with the operation of a given breaker. Whenever fault currents above IOp are de-
tected in a circuit, the corresponding breaker is triggered. IOp reflects the settings of
protective relays that may trigger the studied breaker. IOp is assumed constant since
the minimum relay settings do not change.
A conditional probability density function wOp(IF ) is obtained from w(IF ) by
removing current magnitudes below IOp and by normalizing the rest of the density
function (Figure 24). It is important to note that wOp(IF ) provides the probability
of direct stresses for the studied breaker:
wOp(IF ) =

w(IF )∫ +∞
IOp
w(I) dI
if IF ≥ IOp,
0 otherwise.
(12)
Probability density of currents wOp(IF)
with circuit breaker operation
Zone of no 
breaker operation
w(IF)
Figure 24: Conditional PDF of fault currents (condition: breaker operated).
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5.4.2 Interrupting Failure Function
An interruption failure function pF (IF ) for each breaker is postulated; the function
provides the probability of a breaker failure for each value of the fault current IF
through the breaker at the time of operation (Figure 25). Low fault currents (Zone 1)
do not contribute to breaker failure as opposed to high fault currents (Zone 2) that
always cause breaker failure. Also, between the two zones is a transition region where
the failure probability gradually increases with the current. This transition region is
delimited with the currents I0 and I1, which are the low and high failure thresholds,
respectively. It is assumed that the rated current IN , I0, and I1 when the breaker is in
new condition can be determined using manufacturer data. The analytical expression
of the postulated interrupting failure function is
PF (IF ) =

0 if IF < I0,
IF − I0
I1 − I0 if I0 ≤ IF ≤ I1,
1 if IF > I1.
(13)
0
1
IF
pF(IF)
I0 I1IN
Zone 1
No failures
Zone 2
Failures
Figure 25: Curve for the postulated breaker interruption failure function.
5.4.3 Stress-Induced Failure Rate
The breaker failure rate is determined from an estimation of the stress-induced prob-
ability of circuit breaker failure. This probability is computed by first multiplying the
curves shown in Figures 24 and 25. This intermediate product, wOp(IF ) × PF (IF ),
holds under the condition of breaker operation. Therefore, the stress-induced proba-
bility of breaker failure is obtained by multiplying the product between the two curves
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with the probability of breaker operation.
The probability of breaker operation is the probability that a fault occurs, such
that the current IF through the studied breaker causes that breaker to operate
(wOp(IF ) 6= 0). This probability and the subsequent failure rate computations are
tied to a given time frame, one year for instance. Assuming nF faults were simu-
lated to obtain the w(IF ) and wOp(IF ) distributions over the given time frame, the
corresponding number of breaker operations is
nOp = nF
∫ +∞
IOp
w(IF ) dIF . (14)
The nF faults simulated do not necessarily have to be uniformly distributed within
the system transmission paths. Some lines may have a higher fault rate than others,
and this fact is already accounted for in the current distribution.
The number of faults nF and number of breaker operations nOp being statistical
numbers (e.g. number of breaker operations per year), the probability of breaker
operation is computed from a Poisson distribution with parameter λ = nOp. If X
denotes the number of breaker operations (a random variable) in the given time
frame, the general expression of the probability for n operations to occur during the
same time frame is
P (X = n) =
λne−λ
n!
, (15)
with X ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0.
The desired probability of breaker operation is complementary to the probability
of no breaker operation:
P (X = 0) =
λ0e−λ
0!
= e−λ = e−nOp ,
P (X > 0) = 1− P (X = 0) = 1− e−nOp . (16)
Finally, the stress-induced failure probability for the given time frame is
PStress =
(
1− e−nOp) ∫ +∞
0
wOp(IF )× PF (IF ) dIF . (17)
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The stress-induced failure rate is then obtained, again assuming that breaker
failures obey a Poisson process:
PStress =
(
1− e−λStress)
λStress = − ln(1− PStress) (18)
5.5 Impact of Generation Capacity Growth
Fault currents through a circuit breaker evolve with time. The growth of power
systems is one cause of increased circuit breaker failures because generation capacity
growth directly contributes to increases of fault currents and stresses. As a result, the
evolution of the fault current PDF is modeled with a postulated pattern of generation
capacity growth over the studied time horizon.
5.5.1 Generation Capacity Growth Model
Additions to the generating capacity occur at discrete times that correspond to the
commissioning of new utility plants, independently-owned generators, and distributed
generation. As a result, the planning horizon (ten, twenty, thirty years) is separated
into a number of time intervals, for example one-year intervals. The generation ca-
pacity increases at the end of each interval. This time discretization is arbitrary and
can be coarser or finer as needed. The probability density functions of expected fault
currents through each breaker are re-evaluated with the expected generating capacity
when entering a new time interval.
Assuming a time horizon [t0, tmax], increases in generation capacity occur at times
t1, t2, . . . , tn, with t0 ≤ ti ≤ tmax and ti−1 < ti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each of these
times, the expected increase in capacity is ∆c1, ∆c2, . . . , ∆cn, with ∆ci > 0 for all i.
The sum of the discrete increases is the overall projected growth ∆c of the installed
generation capacity over the time horizon. If the initial installed capacity is c0, the
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ending generation capacity is c0 + ∆c. For example, if the overall growth of installed
generation in a country is 5% over tmax− t0 = 10 years, one would write ∆c/c0 = 5%.
The discretized generation growth pattern described is illustrated in Figure 26.
time
c0
t0
//
//
t1 t2 tn tmax
Installed generation capacity
Δc1
Δc2
Δcn Δc
Initial 
capacity
Ending 
capacity
c0
Figure 26: Postulated generation growth pattern.
5.5.2 Increase in Circuit Breaker Fault Currents
The statistical PDF of stresses w(IF ) introduced in Chapter 4 maps the probability
density of fault currents IF for a given breaker. The PDF of stresses is recomputed
every time the generation capacity of the system increases and every time the topology
of the system changes. The result is a set of PDFs w[ti](IF ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n that represent
the statistical evolution of the duty of the studied breaker over the chosen time
horizon. (The notation x[ti](•) denotes the form taken by the variable or function
x(•) during time interval [ti, ti+1].)
In the absence of historical data, the evolution of the PDF of interrupted currents
can be estimated theoretically by mapping fault currents at time ti to their expected
value between ti+1 and ti+2, assuming an average growth rate of ∆ci+1/ci:
IF [ti+1] = IF [ti]
(
1 +
∆ci+1
ci
)
. (19)
The PDF of fault currents at time ti+1 is thus
w[ti+1](IF ) = w[ti]
(
IF
1 + ∆ci+1
ci
)
. (20)
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The estimate above is not unreasonable if distributed generation is expected to grow
uniformly throughout the system as more customers adopt power suppliers outside of
conventional large-scale utility plants.
5.5.3 Estimation of the Cumulative Current Interrupted and the Number
of Operations
The interrupting failure function above also varies depending on the history of in-
terruptions. Specifically, the failure thresholds I0 and I1 of the interrupting failure
function change with the cumulative current interrupted and the number of interrup-
tions. (Typical recommendations can be found in IEEE standards C37.04 [37] and
C37.06 [154].)
Past operations of a breaker, including the levels of currents interrupted, are
assumed recorded by the owning utility. The expected number of future operations of
the same breaker is determined from an estimate of the number of faults per year nF
corresponding to the simulated current PDF divided by the scaling factor to obtain
the conditional PDF shown in Figure 24. Specifically, the expected number of future
operations nOp[ti] in the time interval [ti, ti+1] is
nOp[ti] = nF (ti+1 − ti)
∫ +∞
IOp
w[ti](IF ) dIF . (21)
The total average current interrupted IOp[ti] in the time interval [ti, ti+1] is ob-
tained by multiplying the number of operations during that time, nOp[ti], with the
average RMS value of currents interrupted by the breaker in the same time interval:
IOp[ti] = nOp[ti]
∫ +∞
0
wOp[ti](IF ) dIF . (22)
The breaker cumulated duty at time t ∈ [ti, ti+1] is estimated from the number of
operations of the considered breaker:
ICumul(t) = ICumul(ti) +
⌊
t− ti
ti+1 − tinOp[ti]
⌋
IOp[ti]. (23)
(The half brackets denote the integer part of the enclosed expression.)
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The recursive expression above can be converted into a closed-form expression,
for t ∈ [ti, ti+1], again:
ICumul(t) = ICumul(t0) +
i−1∑
j=0
IOp[tj] +
⌊
t− ti
ti+1 − tinOp[ti]
⌋
IOp[ti], (24)
where ICumul(t0) is the cumulated duty of the considered breaker at the beginning of
the studied time horizon. The cumulated duty of the considered breaker at t0 depends
on the breaker interruption and maintenance history.
5.5.4 Degradation of Breaker Interrupting Capabilities with Time
Two failure threshold currents I0 and I1 are defined in Section 5.4.1. The interrupting
capability of a circuit breaker tends to decrease as the number of operations and the
cumulated duty increase. In other terms, I0 and I1 decrease from one time interval
[ti, ti+1] to the next.
There are many ways to model the degradation of the interrupting capability of
circuit breakers. In this study, the upper failure threshold current I1 declines to 90%
of its original value when the cumulated duty reaches 8 times the breaker rating; the
lower threshold current I0 is 75% of the upper threshold:
I1(t) = I1(t0)
(
1− 0.1ICumul(t)
IStd
)
, (25)
I0(t) = 0.75 I1(t), (26)
where IStd is the standard cumulated duty of the breaker before heavy maintenance or
replacement is needed, as recommended in IEEE Standard C37.04 [37] for example.
For each time interval [ti, ti+1], the probability and rate of breaker failure are com-
puted using Equations (17) and (18) with the indexed quantities nOp[ti], wOp[ti](IF ),
and PF [ti](IF ).
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5.6 Circuit Breaker Reliability and Time-to-Failure Model
5.6.1 Per-Component State Space and State Probabilities
The proposed circuit breaker reliability model is built from the combination of the
reliability models of its individual components. As already stated in Section 3.2.5.1,
the individual breaker components focus on specific functional aspects of the device.
The selection of the functional components varies from one study to the other [119,
120] depending on the particular needs of these studies. In this study, breakers
have four functional elements listed in Table 12. Examples of failure modes for each
component are also shown in the table.
Table 12: Breaker components and examples of component failure modes
Component Index Failure Modes
Relay R Failure to detect or respond to fault conditions
Failure to send trip signals to breakers
Trip Mechanism T Failure to initiate plate separation; issues with
trip coil
Mechanical Support M Failure to fully open the contacts at desired speed
e.g. bad grease, obstacles in plate motion, broken
arms, etc.
Base Plates P Failure to interrupt the arc, dielectric failure, or
plates fail to separate (welding)
5.6.1.1 State Spaces and Transitions
Each breaker component X has its own failure rate λX(t) and a constant repair
rate µX . The performance of the circuit breaker as a whole depends on whether its
components are functionally operational or not, with respective probabilities pX(t)
and qX(t). The functional and failed state probabilities satisfy
qX(t) = 1− pX(t)
0 ≤ pX(t) ≤ 1
0 ≤ qX(t) ≤ 1.
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Plates
  1 pP(t)
  0 qP(t)
Mechanical
support
  1 pM(t)
  0 qM(t)
Trip
mechanism
  1 pT(t)
  0 qT(t)
Relay
  1 pR(t)
  0 qR(t)
State: 
components 
functional
State: 
components 
failed
λR(t) λT(t) λM(t) λP(t)
μR μT μM μP
Figure 27: Illustration of the functional states of each breaker component.
For each breaker component, the transitions between the functional state and the
failed state can be modeled as independent, continuous-time Markov chains (Fig-
ure 27). Transitions from the operational to the failed states are denoted in the figure
by arrows with the corresponding failure rate. An exponential model is used under
the assumption that failures occur independently of previous failures and repairs.
Assuming that only the breaker plates must endure fault interruption, the failure
rate of the plates has an additional term compared to other breaker components,
which is the stress-induced failure rate λStress obtained from Equation (18).
5.6.1.2 Per-Component State Probabilities
The simultaneous failure of two or more breaker components is excluded as com-
ponents have independent failure modes. Assuming only one component fails at a
time, the state probabilities for each individual component are obtained from ba-
sic continuous-time Markov chain theory. The differential equations that govern the
transitions from the operational to the failed state of each component are
dpX
dt
= −λX(t)pX(t) + µXqX(t), (27)
dqX
dt
= λX(t)pX(t)− µXqX(t). (28)
The initial conditions represent a fully operational breaker:
pX(0) = 1 and qX(0) = 0. (29)
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Assuming λX remains constant during a certain time period, the solution to the
differential equations above gives the probabilities of being in the operational state
or being the in the failed state for each individual breaker component:
pX(t) =
λX
λX + µX
(
µX
λX
+ e−(λX+µX)t
)
, (30)
qX(t) =
λX
λX + µX
(
1− e−(λX+µX)t) , (31)
with t being counted from the beginning of the considered time horizon. Long-run
probabilities with constant failure and repair rates are
pX(∞) = µX
λX + µX
and qX(∞) = λX
λX + µX
. (32)
5.6.2 Aging Factor
All breaker components are subject to aging. The aging failure rates are different for
each component. Many gradual failures described in [59] are aging-related failures or
hidden failures that become apparent as a result of an aging process.
One way to model the evolution of aging-related failure rates is through the well-
known “bathtub” equations. Bathtub failure rates with respect to time can be gener-
ated using a sum of three Weibull functions:
λX,aging(t) =
3∑
i=1
αiλ
a
X(λ
a
Xt)
αi−1 (33)
with α1 < 1, α2 = 1, and α3 > 1. The subscript X denotes one of the four breaker
components enumerated in Figure 29. The constants λaX for each device are assumed
known from the reliability data from the relay and breaker manufacturers.
5.6.3 Circuit Breaker State Space
Assuming each of the four components of the breaker operates and fails indepen-
dently, there are 16 possible Markov states for each breaker. All possible transitions
between the 16 states involving the failure or repair of a single component are shown
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in Figure 28. Each direction and type of line in Figure 28 corresponds to a change
of state of the same component. For instance, vertical lines always correspond to
failures or repairs of the trip mechanism; transitions 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, etc. involve
the relay. Each state is identified by a number that is used in Table 13 to identify
which components of the breaker are operational and which components have failed.
Transitions and rates3
4
5 7
6 8
Fully operational 
state
All components 
failed
2
1
Failures (λX) Repairs (μX)
R
ep
ai
rs
 (μ
X
)
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ilu
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s 
(λ
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11
12
13 15
14 16
10
9
Mechanical support
λM(t), μM
Relay
λR(t), μR
Trip mechanism
λT(t), μT
Base plates
λP(t) + λStress(t), μP
Figure 28: Circuit breaker state space showing failure or repair transitions involving
a single component only.
Table 13: Breaker state enumeration and incidence matrix. Marks indicate a failed
component.
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Relay ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Mechanical ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Trip ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Plates ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Because the breaker components fail independently, the probability to be in each
breaker state is the product of the corresponding state probabilities of each com-
ponent. For example, in state number 4, the plates and the trip mechanism are
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operational, but the mechanical support and the relay link have failed. Therefore,
the probability for this state is
p4(t) = pP (t)×pT (t)×qM(t)×qR(t) = pP (t)×pT (t)× (1−pM(t))× (1−pR(t)). (34)
Only one state with all components functional (State 1 in Table 13) represents
the breaker in good operating condition. All other states (States 2 to 16) have at
least one component failed. All the components listed in Table 12 are necessary for
breaker operation, and fault interruption cannot be completed if any of the breaker
components is not operational. As a result, all breaker components are said to be in
series in the reliability block diagram [155] (Figure 29).
Relay PlatesTripMechanism
Mechanical 
Support
Figure 29: Series reliability block diagram of circuit breaker components.
As a result of using a series reliability diagram, the circuit breaker Markov model
used in this study is reduced to two states shown in Figure 30. The combined fail-
ure and repair rate of the breaker is the sum of the failure rates of the individual
components:
λCB(t) = λR(t) + λT (t) + λM(t) + λP (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λP,aging(t)+λStress(t)
. (35)
µCB = µR + µT + µM + µP . (36)
Using the simplified two-state Markov chain and assuming the failure and repair
rates remain constant during a certain time horizon, the estimated probability of a
breaker failure is computed using Equation (32):
qCB(∞) = λCB
λCB + µCB
. (37)
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(one or more 
components failed)
Total failure rate: 
λM(t) + λR(t) + λT(t) + λP(t) + λStress(t)
Figure 30: Simplified circuit breaker two-state space with an operating and a failed
state.
5.6.4 Estimation of Circuit Breaker Time-to-Failure
The failure rate from the working state to the failed state of the breaker is the sum
of the failure rates of the individual components:
λCB(t) = λR(t) + λT (t) + λM(t) + λP (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λP,aging(t)+λStress(t)
. (38)
With the knowledge of the failure rate as a function of time, the PDF of the
time-to-failure can be computed [155] and is given by
fMTTF (t) = λCB(t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λCB(τ) dτ
)
. (39)
The equation above provides the density of probability of the MTTF of the considered
breaker from the present time. The PDF of the MTTF accounts for the expected
growth of the power system under a scenario such as the one outlined in Section 5.5.
In particular, the expected MTTF can be obtained from this distribution by taking
the mean value of the distribution using
MTTFEst. =
∫ +∞
0
t× fMTTF (t) dt, or (40)
MTTFEst. = tM , with tM such that
∫ tM
0
fMTTF (t) dt =
1
2
. (41)
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5.7 Summary
With the expansion of power systems with new power plants and distributed gen-
eration, the issue of circuit breaker overstress arises when fault currents exceed the
ratings of a number of breakers. Overstressed breakers are more likely to fail than
breakers that are not overstressed.
The focus of this chapter is on a methodology to quantify the stress-induced
probability of breaker failures, or the risk that a breaker fails while opening currents
in excess of its rating. The proposed methodology has two highlights: a three-phase,
breaker-oriented fault analysis methodology to compute a fault current PDF through
all the breakers in a test system, and a procedure to determine a stress-induced
breaker failure rate from the fault current PDF. A theoretical account for the growth
of generation capacity is also given since circuit breaker adequacy issues have come
from system expansion to accommodate a growing demand for electricity.
A circuit breaker time-to-failure model is proposed that combines the stress-
induced breaker failure probability with other failure rates (aging) into a Markov
model. The time-to-failure model is determined over a time horizon to account for
the expansion of power systems.
A numerical application of the concepts outlined so far is presented in Chapter 7.
With a quantified knowledge of circuit breaker stresses and stress-related failures,
breaker upgrades and replacements can be targeted to devices with the highest fail-
ure probability. Because of budgets, system operating constraints, and manufacturer
performance, breaker replacements and upgrades take a certain time during which
the system must be operated at a set reliability level. To maintain such a reliability
level, there are operational constraints to consider; in addition, actions can be taken
to circumvent circuit breaker overstress until the breaker replacement process is com-
plete. Chapter 6 is devoted to new operational constraints and remedial actions to
keep circuit breakers within their operating limits.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS OF CIRCUIT BREAKER RELIABILITY
IN POWER SYSTEMS OPERATION
6.1 Overview
Power system operations and protection must continue at an acceptable reliability
level between the time a breaker is “diagnosed” with overstress problems and the
time the breaker is upgraded or replaced. Identifying circuit breakers as overstressed
increases the number of devices that utilities must plan to replace. Circuit breaker
replacements are usually dictated by the capital (infrastructure) investment plans
of the utilities. Capital improvement plans apply to only a small fraction of the
equipment at a time and are executed over several years. Delays in breaker upgrades
or replacements may arise because of budgetary, operating, and manufacturer supply
constraints. As a result, the time needed for breaker replacements may vary depending
on the resources of the utility and the condition of the breakers that need to be
replaced.
Knowing that replacing overstressed breakers may take a significant amount of
time, utilities cannot operate power systems without considering overstressed break-
ers, because overstressed breakers are more likely to fail than breakers that are not
overstressed. The operation of overstressed breakers leads to increased failure risks,
risks of property losses, and degraded system reliability from extensive, common-
mode outages. A failed breaker is a breaker lost for protection schemes. Stresses not
handled by the failed breaker must be handled by surrounding portions of the sys-
tem. These unintended transfers of stresses accelerate equipment degradation. This
means the failure of overstressed breakers must be avoided when protection schemes
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are activated.
Circuit breaker adequacy and overstress problems can be circumvented on a tem-
porary basis until overstressed breakers are upgraded or replaced, to the extent that
addressing circuit breaker overstress is compatible with existing system operating con-
straints. Three types of corrective measures that can be combined for an increased
impact are described in this chapter:
• Prevent circuit breaker operation when fault currents exceed breaker ratings;
• Reduce fault currents through overstressed breakers; and
• Reconfigure substations, temporarily, to control of the flow of fault currents
through overstressed breakers.
These actions take advantage of the fact that overstressed breakers can still handle
fault currents that are within their ratings, but that their protection role should be
delegated under fault conditions that create breaker adequacy problems.
In this chapter, immediate applications of the corrective measures above to substa-
tion protection schemes are discussed, such as substation reconfiguration, generator
dispatch, and the insertion of current limiting devices. In particular, for substation
reconfiguration, an algorithm to determine a switching sequence is proposed that
takes advantage of the ratings and stresses on other breakers to allow overstressed
breakers to interrupt faults. These corrective actions are qualified of immediate be-
cause they can be implemented in the protection schemes at little to no capital cost
while maintaining the necessary protection functionality.
6.2 Potential for Common-Mode Outages
Overstressed breakers have higher failure probabilities than breakers that operate
within their interrupting capability. When breakers fail to clear a fault, backup
protection schemes are activated until fault conditions are removed. The operation
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of backup protection as a result of a breaker failure results in power outages affecting
additional areas besides the ones intended (Figure 31). Because such outages are
linked to a single failure mode (the failure of a single breaker), such outages are
referred to as common-mode outages.
Area 1
Breaker 1 
operates
Fault 1
Outage in 
Area 1
…
Area k
Breaker k 
operates
Fault k
Outage in 
Area k
Single fault
Breaker 1 operates
Breaker 1 fails
Breaker 2 
operates … Breaker k operates
Common-mode outage in Areas 1, 2, … , k
Areas 1, 2, … , k
Independent-mode outages
Figure 31: Genesis of common-mode outages vs. independent-mode outages.
The extent of the consequences of a breaker failure depends on the topology of
the concerned substations and how failed breakers are connected to the rest of their
parent substations. Generally, as shown in Figure 32, a breaker failure causes a num-
ber of breakers in substations surrounding the fault to operate. Substations with
double-bus, double-breaker arrangements are the least vulnerable to breaker failures.
In substations without internal path redundancy, such as the single bus/breaker ar-
rangement, breaker failures result in the outage of all lines that converge at such
substations.
The potential for large common-mode outages becomes a factor in the decision
to operate an overstressed breaker. For example, breakers likely to cause extended
common-mode outages are operated sparingly compared to breakers that could occa-
sionally cause limited common-mode outages.
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Figure 32: Backup protection (common-mode outage) propagation in common sub-
station breaker arrangements.
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6.3 Implications on Substation Protection
The following adjustments to substation protection schemes help keep circuit breakers
within their operating limits. Each adjustment addresses one of the three aspects of
focusing on circuit breaker reliability in power systems operations:
• Overstressed breakers are locked in closed or open position when fault currents
are above breaker ratings.
• Current limiting devices in lines and substation branches reduce fault currents
through overstressed breakers.
• Operating breakers in sequence and reconfiguring substation topologies help
gain control of how fault currents flow throughout substations.
6.3.1 Adjustments to the Operations of Overdutied Breakers
The direct approach to prevent overstressed breakers from breaking fault currents
in excess of their ratings consists of three remedial actions: (i) keeping overstressed
breakers closed, (ii) keeping them open, and (iii) delaying their operation until the DC
offset decays. This direct approach deals with the overstressed breakers themselves
without considering the rest of the host substations.
6.3.1.1 Preventing Circuit Breaker Operation
Keeping overstressed breakers open or closed prevents their failures but imposes fault
duty constraints on other circuit breakers.
On one hand, when a breaker is forced closed, the protective role normally assumed
by the closed breaker must be transferred to other breakers within the substation
without creating breaker adequacy problems. Adequacy problems arise when two
or more breakers are triggered in sequence to clear a single fault. Indeed, after the
operation of the first breaker, fault currents are distributed across fewer branches
(Figure 33).
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1 !
Breaker (closed)
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Figure 33: Illustration of breaker duties in different opening sequences.
On the other hand, with an open breaker in an affected substation, the statistical
stresses of other breakers in the substation are changed as a result of a redistribution
of fault currents across a reduced number of substation branches. (Fault currents
are more “concentrated.”) This results in increased fault currents through certain
breakers. To continue reliable power system operations, keeping a breaker open should
not create or worsen breaker adequacy issues.
6.3.1.2 Delaying Circuit Breaker Operation
Delayed breaker operations are possible when currents drawn by a fault marginally
exceed the ratings of the breakers that must clear the fault.
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Delaying breaker operation allows the DC offset to decay. The DC offset increases
the RMS value of the current immediately after the onset of a fault (Equation (4)
and Figure 5). The time delay to operate overdutied breakers extends the duration of
fault conditions and must be compatible with the additional stresses that the affected
equipment can bear.
Delaying relay/breaker operations may help solve the overstress problem for cer-
tain breakers and has several advantages:
• In a substation, only up to two breakers are affected.
• There is no loss of substation connectivity.
• The remedy is easy to implement using computer-based relays.
The drawbacks of delayed breaker operations are the following:
• Delayed breaker operations are possible only if the desired reduction of fault
current levels does not exceed the possible reduction of the amplitude of the
DC offset at the time of breaker operation.
• Fault conditions persist several cycles beyond the original instant of fault isola-
tion.
• Delayed breaker operations may lead to system instability.
• The protective schemes of the substation must be tested to avoid undesired
protection response.
6.3.2 Integration of Current Limiting Devices
Current limiting devices prevent fault currents from exceeding certain values. As a
result, current limiting devices can be integrated into protection schemes to preserve
the adequacy of otherwise overdutied breakers.
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The specific effects sought from current limiting devices are to (i) bring fault
currents below breaker ratings and (ii) obtain the desired protection response from
protective relays.
The installation of current limiting devices does not require taking lines out of
service or other heavy substation work. Devices that can be clamped to transmission
lines and bus bars are being developed [156]. The knowledge of stress-induced breaker
failure rates allows utilities and system operators to target the installation of current
limiting devices to the breakers that have the highest risk of failure. Of course, to
avoid undesired side effects, protection schemes must be adapted to account for the
presence of current limiting devices.
6.3.3 Operating Overdutied Breakers in Sequence
Operating overdutied breakers in sequence and reconfiguring substations help control
how fault currents are distributed throughout the branches of a substation. If two or
more breakers protect a single line (in ring and breaker-and-a-half arrangements, for
instance), currents are interrupted in successive stages that correspond to the opening
of each breaker.
To operate overdutied breakers in sequence, the challenge is, ideally, to determine
a sequence involving surrounding breakers in such a way that no breaker becomes
overdutied as the sequence is executed. Specifically, when two breakers must isolate
the same branch, opening one breaker results in fault currents being transferred to the
other breaker (Figure 33). The transferred fault currents may cause other substation
breakers that remain closed to become overstressed. Such side effects must be avoided
to maintain appropriate circuit breaker and system reliability levels.
Using appropriate switching sequences, fault current levels through overstressed
breakers can be reduced, and overstressed breakers may continue clearing faults with-
out the risk of failure.
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Operating breakers in a specific order is possible with computer-based relays using
the high-speed communications technology and infrastructure available.
6.3.4 Substation Topologies to Preserve Breaker Adequacy
Adjusting, delaying, or preventing circuit breaker operation, integrating current lim-
iting devices, and operating breakers in sequence are remedies that can be combined
to obtain network or substation topologies that preserve circuit breaker adequacy.
Ultimately, power systems should operate with the objective of minimizing circuit
breaker failure or minimizing circuit breaker overstress. Topologies that preserve
circuit breaker adequacy can serve in two opposite scenarios:
• Transient topologies are maintained while appropriate breakers remove contri-
butions to fault currents, taking excess duty away from the most overstressed
breakers. The breakers that were overstressed can at that point clear the fault
without loss of reliability. The original system topology is restored after fault
conditions are cleared.
• Permanent topologies that minimize breaker failures and that are viable for
continued system operation can be applied system-wide (at the control center
level) or locally at every substation. The use of such topologies is intended to
last until overstressed breakers are upgraded.
6.3.4.1 General Algorithm for Real-Time Substation Topology Switching
Temporary reconfigurations of substations are important to minimize the area af-
fected by the operation of circuit breakers. After the removal of faults, the initial
configurations of substations are restored. This approach is similar to reclosing sce-
narios commonly used with distribution breakers: if a fault on a distribution system
is permanent, the distribution system is reconfigured by closing a normally-open tie
line; reclosers are activated to isolate the fault while maintaining service to the rest of
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the distribution system. In this section, a general algorithm to determine a substation
switching sequence that accounts for circuit breaker stresses and ratings during faults
is described.
The strength of the topology switching approach is in the interrupting capabilities
of other circuit breakers of the substation. In a substation with path redundancy,
breakers can be operated to bring fault currents to a level that is below the ratings
of overstressed breakers that need to isolate the considered fault.
Topology switching requires a real-time model of fault currents for worst-case
faults. Worst-case faults are faults on buses with virtually no limiting impedance
between the fault and the breakers that must be operated. A real-time model is
needed to determine whether breakers are overstressed when a fault occurs. The
knowledge of the exact location of the fault using the communication features of
protective relays is essential for topology switching to be effective. Different criteria
such as breaker ratings, failure rates, and operating margins can be used to select
switching topologies. To simplify the illustration of the concepts introduced in earlier
chapters, this part only considers the rating of the breakers as the most important
factor.
The selection of topology switching sequences should be performed offline with
simulated faults. Working with simulated faults allows testing and refining the se-
lected switching sequence to avoid undesired responses or side effects. In addition, if
no suitable switching sequence has been found, an alarm can be generated to have fur-
ther remedial actions decided by system operators instead of an unavoidable breaker
failure in a real situation.
In the proposed methodology and examples, the term “primary breaker” designates
breakers that are in immediate proximity of a given fault. Primary breakers clear the
fault while removing power from the smallest area possible.
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The general algorithm to select a topology switching sequence for a given substa-
tion and a simulated fault is outlined in Figure 34.
In terms of substation protection, the implications of circuit breaker operating
limits can be summarized with the following question: For each worst-case fault, is
there a temporary substation configuration that allows safe switching of the fault?
Among a family of faults (e.g. line-to-neutral faults on a given line), a worst-case
fault is a fault that draws the highest current compared to other faults in the same
family. For transmission lines, the worst-case faults considered are bus faults at either
end of each transmission lines. Also, different types of faults draw different currents;
for instance, three-phase bus faults are the most severe type of fault for which a
protection plan should be available.
It is not always desirable or possible to change substation topologies to reduce
the duty of overstressed breakers. Substation reconfigurations may not be practical if
intermediate circuit breaker operations before fault isolation cause undesired outages.
Concerns about system stability arise every time a breaker is operated, and there
may be critical durations beyond which temporary configurations cause generator
instability. Furthermore, topologies where no circuit breaker is overdutied do not
necessary exist; in such cases, other remedial actions must be applied to prevent
breaker failures.
6.4 Implications on Economic Dispatch
6.4.1 Generator Commitment and Fault Currents
Reducing the number of generators connected to the system (the generator dispatch),
i.e. reducing the available generating capacity is a more direct means to reduce fault
currents through overstressed breakers than reconfiguring substation or even inserting
fault current limiters. Indeed, it is the available capacity of a connected generator
that determines the magnitude of fault currents contributed by the generator, not the
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Identify primary breakers,
i.e. breakers that clear the fault while affecting the smallest possible area.
Identify loops within the substation that contain two or more primary breakers.
For each such loop, evaluate the duty of primary breakers
before and after opening that loop.
Are there closed substation breakers that are not overdutied, 
that are not part of any loop, and which currents significantly* 
contribute to the duty of primary breakers?
Are there overstressed primary breakers? 
Are there such loops?
No Yes
No Yes
Mark the appropriate breakers as candidate for loop-breaking.
Is it possible to break the loop without overdutying primary breakers?
Yes No
Raise alarm for individual case handling.
Select and open the loop-breaking candidate based on criteria such as
w(IF) failure probability or other factors.
Raise alarm for individual case handling.
Open the primary breakers.
Yes No
Open one out-of-loop breaker.
Fault occurs; identify fault location and choose substation of study.
*Significant contributions to the duty 
of primary breakers to be determined 
at the discretion of system operators.
Figure 34: Algorithm for the selection of a topology switching sequence.
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generated power. Acting on generator commitment tackles the source of the problem:
increased generation capacity from large utility plants to independently-owned, dis-
tributed sources. These adjustment also benefit circuit breakers in substations imme-
diately neighboring the concerned generators because of the relatively low impedance
in between. (The effect of generator output adjustments dampens with distance.)
Adjustments to the economic dispatch are best applied to plants where several
generators do not run at full capacity. In such cases, the output of several generators
can be consolidated, resulting in fewer sources of fault currents. The same strategy
can be applied at new generating plants connected to the network because the output
of new generating plants is meant to gradually increase with the demand over several
years.
It is important to note that generator output adjustments are not available during
peak times, when the available generating capacity is fully utilized. Also, operating
constraints for each generator, such as fuel supplies, startup and shutdown times, may
limit the extent to which the output power from the generators can be consolidated.
Thanks to the linearity of transmission systems, the contribution of generators
brought into service to the fault duty of circuit breakers can be quantified by perform-
ing fault analysis on the studied breakers before and after connecting the dispatched
generators to the rest of the grid.
There are two ways to incorporate circuit breaker operating limits into the eco-
nomic dispatch problem: (i) by maximizing the total power available or (ii) by min-
imizing breaker failure rates. The formulation of these two problems is described
next.
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6.4.2 Maximizing the Total Power Available
In this approach, the objective is to maximize the total available power while limiting
fault currents (and stress-induced failures) through closed breakers:
maximize
∑
i
Pg,ixi
subject to
∑
i
Ikgc,ixi ≤ IkN ∀k ∈ Kj
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i,
where
xi = 1 if generator i is connected, 0 otherwise,
Pg,i is the output of generator i,
Kj is the set of closed breakers in network configuration j,
IkN is the rating of circuit breaker k, and
Ikgc,i,j is the fault contribution of generator i to circuit breaker k in configuration j.
The decision variables are the network configuration Kj and the boolean variables
xi that determine whether generators are in service or not.
6.4.3 Minimizing Circuit Breaker Failure
In this approach, the goal is to minimize stress-induced circuit breaker failures while
serving all loads in the system:
minimize
∑
k∈Kj
PStress,k
subject to
∑
i
Pg,ixi − PLoad − PLosses = 0
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i.
Again, the decision variables are the network configuration Kj and the boolean
variables xi that determine whether generators are in service or not.
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6.4.4 Economic Dispatch Integration
The constraints brought by these two approaches result in a new constrained economic
dispatch problem:
minimize
∑
i
fi(Pg,i)−B1
∑
i
Pg,ixi +B2
∑
k∈Kj
PStress,k
subject to
∑
i
Pg,ixi − PLoad − PLosses = 0
xiPg,i,min ≤ Pg,i ≤ xiPg,i,max ∀ i
B1
∑
i
Ikgc,i,jxi ≤ B1IkN ∀k ∈ Kj
B2PBF,k ≤ B2Pˆ ∀k ∈ Kj
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i
B1 ≥ 0 and B2 ≥ 0,
where B1 and B2 are the relative cost of integrating the circuit breaker operating
limits in the economic dispatch problem. (B1 is associated with a negative sign to
maximize the total available power.)
Because this problem is a mixed-integer programming problem, a solution may
be obtained using optimization techniques such as genetic algorithms, particle swarm
solutions, and so on. In the numerical example of Chapter 7, simple applications of
the two proposed approaches are compared.
It is clear that constraints on economic dispatch and switching sequences are not
designed to be long-term alternatives to replacing overdutied breakers, but rather
short-term operating strategies to preserve circuit breaker adequacies before the pur-
chase and replacement of overdutied breakers can be completed.
6.5 Implications on Control Center Applications
Control centers use network data to run load flow analyses, state estimation, and var-
ious types of energy management systems (EMS) applications. Operators at control
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centers have authority to override relays and manually open/close breakers. With
the massive amount of information that already flows into control centers, operators
must quickly understand arising situations and make decisions that are critical to
maintaining the reliability of power systems.
Circuit breaker monitoring is possible from relays or from control centers. Al-
though relays perform instantaneous performance and status monitoring [74], breaker
duty monitoring from control centers benefits from the knowledge of the topology of
the network and the availability of circuit breaker data as a single entity. With
comprehensive circuit breaker and network information, control centers can perform
system-wide circuit breaker reliability analysis in conjunction with load flows and
fault analyses. The principle of this application is outlined in the workflow shown in
Figure 35.
Start with current network topology.
Compute statistics of fault currents
through each breaker.
Compute the stress-induced
probability of breaker failure.
Display circuit breaker stresses
and relevant reliability data.
Highlight overstressed breakers and
possible generating capacity adjustments.
Operator selects appropriate
network/substation topology.
CONTROL CENTER FIELD DEVICES
Relay/Breaker 1
Relay/Breaker 2
Relay/Breaker n
…
Circuit 
breaker 
status/
data
Trip commands
Figure 35: Concept workflow for monitoring and addressing circuit breaker over-
stress in control centers.
Displays of the overall status of the breakers can be completed as a control center
application. Such displays provide visual clues, such as bars and arrows, that help
determine which circuit breakers are overdutied, which breakers need maintenance,
and so on. An example of such a display is presented in Chapter 7.
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The control center application introduced in this section can benefit from the
selection of paths that minimize breaker failure by presenting different options to
system operators in advance of faults. Operators select which network/substation
reconfiguration scheme should be used based on their experience and knowledge of
the network.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, strategies to circumvent the issue of circuit breaker overstress are
presented. These strategies can be combined to reduce breaker reliability constraints.
The simplest but restrictive solution is to lock overstressed breakers closed or open.
Delayed breaker operations may be successful if fault current RMS values do not
exceed breaker ratings by more than the DC offset and the protected equipment can
withstand prolonged fault conditions.
With current limiting devices gaining in popularity and maturity, current limiting
devices properly selected, placed in series with overstressed breakers appear to address
circuit breaker adequacy with minimum impact.
Substation reconfiguration is a means to redistribute fault currents and adjust
the balance between breaker interrupting capabilities and fault current magnitudes.
Also, currents can be redirected from generators through long sections of the system
instead of directly flowing into a fault. The increased impedances of reconfigured
paths reduce the magnitude of fault currents significantly.
Adjusting generator commitment tackles the source of circuit breaker adequacy
problem: increased generation capacity. The available capacity of a connected gen-
erator, not the generated power, determines the fault currents contributed by that
generator. The consolidation of generator output is available if the resulting reduc-
tion in generating capacity allows the system to meet the demand. Specifically, this
operating strategy is not available when the electricity demand peaks.
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To achieve power systems operations that account for circuit breaker operating
limits, circuit breaker reliability constraints are incorporated into two new formu-
lations of the economic dispatch problem. The solution of the economic dispatch
problem may or may not be compatible with operating policies of the utilities if, for
instance, generation margins are not sufficient or operating costs exceed acceptable
limits.
In Chapter 7, the strategies to address circuit breaker adequacy issues are illus-
trated with a test system and a possible responses to certain fault conditions.
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CHAPTER VII
ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO A 24-SUBSTATION
TEST SYSTEM
7.1 Overview
This chapter consists of numerical examples illustrating the circuit breaker adequacy
issues presented throughout this study. Examples of circuit breaker adequacy, fault,
and reliability analysis are illustrated using a physical, three-phase, breaker-oriented
system based on the IEEE 24-bus system. The generator dispatch, power flow, and
initial circuit breaker data of the test system are provided as initial assumptions.
Different means to monitor circuit breaker reliability data are also presented to give
system operators a quick overall understanding of breaker reliability issues.
Several scenarios are considered as an illustration of circuit breaker adequacy and
reliability issues. First, failure data are compared when factors that affect fault statis-
tics are changed, such as the type of faults, the maximum fault-to-breaker distance,
and the connectivity of substations. The effect of the addition of new generating
capacity on circuit breaker duty is then considered, with an analysis of the impact on
breaker failures and reliability data in the short and long term.
Scenarios involving a simulated fault are also considered, and in each scenario, a
fault clearing strategy that circumvents circuit breaker overstress is presented. Three
types of remedial actions to circumvent circuit breaker adequacy issues are illustrated
with (i) an example of circuit breaker operation in sequence, (ii) an example with an
adjustment of generator dispatch, and (iii) an example illustrating the effect of a
current limiting device on fault currents.
Perspectives for immediate applications of the proposed methodology are also
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suggested, such as statistical circuit breaker duty monitoring and related control
center applications.
7.2 Proposed Three-Phase, Breaker-Oriented, 24-Substation
Reliability Test System
The proposed test system for breaker fault and reliability analysis is based on the
IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS), also known as the IEEE 24-bus system.
The IEEE RTS, first published in 1979 [29], is a reference electric network model to
compare different reliability assessment methodologies based on a common set of gen-
erator and transmission line data, such as fuel costs, power ratings, line impedances,
and outage information. The test system is a single-line equivalent network model
defined with positive sequence, pi-equivalent parameters. The system consists of
24 buses with generators and loads distributed across two areas with different voltage
levels (138 and 230 kV). The RTS was updated in 1986 and 1996 [30] to provide ad-
ditional data for the generation system and to accommodate new methodologies for
power system reliability assessment. The 1996 update is also noteworthy for providing
examples of breaker arrangements at every bus of the RTS.
In this study, the IEEE RTS is modified to enable fault analysis at the circuit
breaker level and to provide a three-phase network model that accurately captures
the phenomena of physical systems. Circuit breaker reliability studies now have access
to accurate fault data for each breaker in the test system.
Each bus in the 24-bus system is replaced with a substation with the corresponding
breaker arrangement found in the 1996 update of the IEEE RTS. An overview of the
resulting test system is shown in Figure 36.
The proposed test system includes 188 breakers distributed in 24 substations.
The system is breaker-oriented because the arrangement of circuit breakers at ev-
ery substation is represented explicitly. Details of the breaker arrangements at two
substations are shown in Figure 37.
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Figure 36: The proposed three-phase, breaker-oriented, 24-substation test system.
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Figure 37: Breaker arrangements at two substations of the proposed breaker-
oriented, 24-substation test system.
Unlike the original test system, which is a single-line, positive sequence equiva-
lent of a power network, the modified test system is a three-phase network model
based on physical parameters of transmission lines. All three phases, the neutral, and
grounding are modeled explicitly to allow independent computations of the electrical
quantities in each conductor. Physical parameters are such that the pi-equivalent,
positive sequence models of the lines have the same parameters (or similar param-
eters) as in the original test system (Figure 38). Slight deviations from the “ideal”
parameters defined in the test system are unavoidable when combining transmission
line geometry and cable properties.
The proposed 24-substation test system is modeled using the WinIGS simulation
software from Advanced Grounding Concepts (http://www.ap-concepts.com/). Com-
plete data for the test system, including line, generator, transformer, and load data,
are publicly available for download (http://pscal.ece.gatech.edu/testsys/).
119
Figure 38: Sample user interface from the WinIGS software to define the parameters
of a three-phase, physical transmission line model.
7.3 Initial Operational Data
7.3.1 Initial Generator Dispatch and Power Flow
The analysis starts with a base case in which the output power of each generator is
initialized. In this example, generator outputs are initialized from data published in
a study on economic dispatch with minimization of line losses [157]. The aggregated
generator outputs at each main bus is shown in Table 14. The table also shows the
type of buses (PV or PQ) that are adopted in this particular example. Other possible
values to initialize generator outputs are given in the 1996 definition of the IEEE RTS
[30]. The generator output the reader elects to assign should be validated by making
the base power flow converge.
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Table 14: Example of generator dispatch for the IEEE 24-bus system (taken from
[157]).
Bus Type Pg (MW) Qg (MVAR)
1 PV 180 13.43
2 PV 180 −18.16
7 PV 240 43.88
13 PV 100 87.24
15 Slack 200 −17.83
16 PV 200 29.38
18 PV 400 140.74
21 PV 400 111.14
22 PV 300 −30.51
7.3.2 Circuit Breaker Fault Analysis
The analysis of the duty of circuit breakers is performed using the breaker-oriented,
three-phase fault analysis methodology presented in Chapter 5. The fault current
PDF is computed for all 188 breakers in the test system using the WinIGS software.
The set of fault current PDFs are the basis for all reliability computations and for
determining operational strategies.
7.3.3 Circuit Breaker Reliability Data
7.3.3.1 Age and Related Failure Rates
Circuit breaker ages are randomly assigned according to a uniform distribution with
a mean of 40 years and a spread of ±20 years. The age distribution of the breakers
is shown in Figure 39.
Age-related failures are modeled using the following bathtub (Weibull) function,
also assuming a 40-year design MTTF (λ = 1/MTTF) and parameters α1 = 0.5,
α2 = 1, and α3 = 10:
λaging(t) =
3∑
i=1
αiλ(λt)
αi−1 (42)
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Figure 39: Age distribution of the circuit breakers in the test system.
Field data, such as annual breaker failure rates from the CIGRÉ survey of circuit
breaker reliability [158], may be used to match the proposed aging model with actual
conditions.
Knowing the circuit breaker ages is not only essential to determine age-related
failure rates, but also to compute reliability quantities linked to the operating history
of the breakers.
7.3.3.2 Failure Thresholds and Estimated Interruption History
Besides the rated breaking current IN , each circuit breaker has a history of interrup-
tions summarized by the total current interrupted and the number of fault clearing
operations. The interrupting thresholds I0 and I1 at the beginning of the consid-
ered time horizon are estimated according to an estimated interruption history using
Equations (25) and (26), rewritten below for reference:
I1(t) = I1(t0)
(
1− 0.1ICumul(t)
IStd
)
,
I0(t) = 0.75 I1(t).
All time-dependent quantities are referred from the time reference t0 (e.g. the initial
commisioning or the latest maintenance of the considered breaker).
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Cumulated breaker duty and number of operations are related because both are
estimated based on the age of circuit breakers. As a matter of fact, when expressed in
per-unit values (as a fraction of the standard cumulated duty or standard number of
operations recommended by standards), the estimated cumulated duty and number
of operations are identical.
The per-unit cumulated duty is utilized to compare the relative maintenance needs
of breakers at different stages of their lifetime. Specifically, 1 per unit means the en-
durance or prescribed cumulated duty for a particular device has been exhausted. To
emulate the effect of maintenance of different units at different times, the cumulated
duty is restricted between 0 and 1.2 per unit. Once the cumulated duty reaches 1.2
per unit, breaker maintenance takes place, and the cumulated duty is reset to zero.
7.3.3.3 Stress-Induced Breaker Failures
For each breaker in the test system, the stress-induced failure probability PStress is
computed using the generated fault current PDF. The procedure to determine PStress
is described in Chapter 5.
Breaker failure data are determined from pre-computed breaker ratings that are,
in turn, generated from the maximum duty found in the breaker fault current PDF.
Breaker ratings are generated by rounding the maximum fault duty to the nearest
even kA rating. For instance, breakers with maximum fault currents of 15.1 kA and
14.9 kA are assigned a rating of 16 kA and 14 kA, respectively. The generated ratings
do not necessarily correspond to typical ratings, but have the advantage of “making”
a number of breakers overstressed on purpose.
A graphical overview of the values for PStress is provided in Figure 40. In the figure,
a plus sign marks the number of breakers (one breaker in most cases) for which PStress
has the corresponding value in abscissa; the continuous graph represents the count of
breakers that have PStress less than the abscissa value of that probability.
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Figure 40: PStress probability distribution for the circuit breakers in the proposed
test system.
7.4 Factors that Affect Fault Current Statistics
The shape of the w(IF ) function obtained from the Monte Carlo fault analysis de-
pends on a number of factors. Variations in these factors affect the contribution of
stresses to breaker failures and system reliability. Variations of the stress-induced
failure probability PStress resulting from network expansion, changes in the maximum
distance between the considered faults and the studied breaker, and changes in the
connectivity of the hosting substation are considered in this example. The effect of
different types of faults on statiscal stress levels, the stress-induced failure probability,
and the overall reliability of the considered circuit breaker is also introduced.
The same breaker in the proposed test system is used to illustrate the factors
discussed above.
7.4.1 Maximum Distance from Breaker to Fault
Fault distributions are compared for faults anywhere in the system (Case (a)), and
within 70 miles (Case (b)) and 50 miles (Case (c)) from the studied breaker (Fig-
ure 41). The computed failure rate is almost identical in the three cases despite the
fact that the relative weight of high fault currents increases in the w(IF ) distribution.
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There are two reasons for this observation: (i) although the scale of the current PDF
is changed, restricting faults to a radius around the studied breaker does not affect
the shape of the failure probability density at high currents and (ii) the conditional
probability density of fault currents utilized in this paper already scales the failure
probability density. The fault current PDF assuming breaker operation, WOp(IF ),
already implies constraints on the magnitude (i.e. distance) of faults that the breaker
is going to trip.
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Figure 41: Effect of the maximum fault distance on breaker stresses.
7.4.2 Fault Types and Probability
Line-to-ground, line-to-line, and three-phase faults do not occur with the same prob-
ability (Table 5 in Chapter 2). Single-line-to neutral/ground faults are the most
common. The accuracy of the distribution of fault currents depends on how close the
relative statistical frequencies of the simulated faults are from reality.
To give the reader an idea of the expected effects, results from a limited number of
faults simulated on lines that connect to the substation containing the studied circuit
breaker are provided. Four fault current PDFs are manually computed, one for each
fault type considered, and the current PDFs are weighted using the factors found in
Table 5. There are slight differences in the PDFs from one type of fault to the other.
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The differences can be visually tracked by placing the fault PDFs side by side, as
shown in Figure 42.
Differences in statistical failure probabilities may vary from one system to another
when considering only one versus several types of faults. Depending on the charac-
teristics of the system studied, the differences may be significant enough to improve
or deteriorate circuit breaker reliability indices.
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Figure 42: Visual comparison of fault current statistics by fault type.
The study of the effect of different types of faults on the fault current densities
can be automated with a selection of fault types to consider when performing the
Monte Carlo simulation of system faults. The selection of the considered fault types
can be integrated into the WinIGS fault current distribution feature, for instance.
7.4.3 Substation Connectivity
The effect of substation connectivity is highlighted in Section 7.7.3 dealing with
switching sequences. When breakers open one after the other, several intermedi-
ate states of substation connectivity are revealed, and fault currents through the
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involved breakers vary with the equivalent impedance of the paths available within
the substation.
7.5 Impact of Generating Plant Additions on Breaker Fail-
ures
In this section, two combined generating plants are added to the proposed test system.
The added generating capacity is 4 × 155 MW at each plant substation. The total
increase in generation capacity is 1.24 GW. The following example demonstrates
how the addition of generating units makes certain breakers overdutied, and how
such additions affect circuit breaker reliability indices.
The generator substation layout is shown in Figure 43. The new generator substa-
tions connect with the rest of the network at Substation 230, as shown in Figure 44.
The new substations are numbered 230-A and 230-C.
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Figure 43: Topology of the two generating plants added to the network.
The breaker considered in this example is Breaker 185 in Figure 44. In Figure 45,
the statistical fault current levels for the considered breaker are shown before and
after the addition of the two generating plants. A shift in the fault current PDF
towards high currents is apparent when new plants are connected with the rest of the
system.
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Figure 44: Connections of new generator plants to the test system.
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Figure 45: Comparison of statistical fault current levels at Breaker 185 before and
after connecting new generating plants to the test system.
Assuming that Breaker 185 has a 14 kA rating, the rating is appropriate for the
initial case where maximum fault currents do not exceed 12.2 kA. After the addition
of the new generating plants, the maximum fault current level is 29 kA and largely
exceeds the original rating of the breaker. Breaker 185 has become overdutied.
Based on the PDFs of fault currents shown in Figure 45, the breaker failure prob-
abilities before and after connecting the new generator plants are as follows:
• Before (initial failure probability): 6.68× 10−5
• After (final failure probability): 1.80× 10−4
The breaker data used to compute the numbers above are as follows: rating: 14 kA;
and minimum operating current of 2.1 kA.
As expected from the shifting of the fault current PDF to high fault levels, the
addition of the new generator plants increased the failure probability of the studied
breaker. Factors such as DC offset and endurance have not been taken into consider-
ation at this point and are described in further detail in the next section.
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7.6 Impact of Generation Growth Forecast on Breaker Fail-
ures
7.6.1 Generation Capacity Growth Scenario
The proposed test system is extended several times with generator substations and
short lines that link the new plants to the rest of the system. Small generators are
also added to represent distributed sources at substations that do not originally have
generators. The generation capacity growth scenario is outlined in Table 15, adding
434 MW of capacity to the proposed test system over 10 years. (+14% or +1.5%/year
average increase). Fault analysis is performed for the focused breaker at every update
of the system model.
This generation capacity growth scenario uses the proposed 24-substation test
system with some adjustments in the initial power flow data. To help retain the
relevant faults that the focused breaker may eventually interrupt, the location of the
simulated faults is limited to a 70-mile radius around the substation. This radius is
just above the length of the longest line leaving Substation 230 in the test system (67
miles), and the considered area covers Zone 2 of the distance protection function.
Table 15: Generation capacity growth example scenario.
Year Affected Substation Added Capacity (MW) Total Capacity (MW)
0 (t0) N/A Initial system 3150
1 (t1) Substation 190 +20 3170
2 (t2) Substation 240 +12 3182
3 (t3) New Substation 250 +155 3337
4 (t4) N/A No additions 3337
5 (t5) Substation 200 +20 3357
6 (t6) New Substation 260 +20 3377
7 (t7) Substation 170 +20 3397
8 (t8) New Substation 250 +155 3552
9 (t9) Substation 150 +12 3564
10 (t10) New Substation 260 +20 3584
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Growth is forecast for 10 years ahead, for example using generating units under
construction or planning. Beyond 10 years, growth trends are used because the evo-
lution of the generating capacity is more uncertain than in the first 10-year horizon.
7.6.2 Fault Current Increase Analysis
The increase in fault currents through the studied breaker as a result of generation
capacity growth is depicted in Figure 46, where fault current probability densities for
each time interval are drawn with a vertical offset to show the expected evolution of
maximum fault currents. The relative increases seem proportional to the additions to
the generator fleet outlined in Table 15. In this particular case, the maximum fault
currents through the studied breaker increase by 24% (from 17.6 kA to 21.8 kA).
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Figure 46: Evolution of statistical fault current levels for the studied breaker over
the 10-year horizon.
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7.6.3 Evolution of Breaker Duty and Interrupting Capabilities
7.6.3.1 Initial Breaker Ratings
Initial breaker ratings (breakers in new condition) are as follows: I0 = 12 kA, I1 =
15 kA, and IN = 12.5 kA based on symmetrical RMS currents. Cumulated breaker
duties are expressed in terms of asymmetrical fault currents. Assuming the contact
parting time of all breakers is 2 cycles at 60 Hz, the X/R ratio is 17, and the relay
response time is 0.5 cycles, it follows that the DC offset multiplier is 1.146, and the
required asymmetrical interrupting capability is IN,Asym = 14.33 kA. Then, from [37],
IStd = 8IN,Asym = 114.6 kA.
When actual breaker ratings are not available from utilities or manufacturers
(especially for the oldest devices), breaker ratings must be estimated. For illustrative
purposes, the studied breaker is at half of its service life at the beginning of the
scenario. In other words, the breaker is 20 years old at t = t0, and its intended
service life is 40 years. As a result, ICumul(t0) = IStd/2 = 57.3 kA. Using Equations
(25) and (26), I0(0) = 11.7 kA and I1(0) = 14.25 kA.
7.6.3.2 Evolution of the Cumulated Duty
All lines are assumed to experience 10 faults per year per 100 miles, on average.
Faults within a 70-mile radius around Substation 230 affect 319.3 miles of transmission
lines. The corresponding number of faults interrupted by the considered breaker is
nF = 31.93 faults/year. The number of faults and the average duty in each [ti, ti+1]
time interval are shown in Table 16. The evolution of the cumulative duty is computed
with respect to time using Equation (24) and is shown in Figure 47. Note that in
Figure 47, one of the curves exhibits variations at discrete time intervals; the other
curve interpolates the discrete curve and reflects a continuous variation of the plotted
variables. The interpolation is computed by dividing the time horizon into weeks
(years are marked as multiples of 52 weeks).
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Table 16: Number of operations and cumulated duty for each discrete time interval.
Year i nOp,i (until ti+1) Average Duty (kA) IOp,i (kA)
0 (t0) 1.466321 5.615759 8.234508
1 (t1) 1.500455 5.619918 8.432432
2 (t2) 1.500455 5.620406 8.433164
3 (t3) 1.535641 5.939203 9.120486
4 (t4) 1.535641 5.939203 9.120486
5 (t5) 1.538402 5.946327 9.326229
6 (t6) 1.568114 5.955379 9.338715
7 (t7) 1.568114 5.952926 9.334868
8 (t8) 1.588805 6.197937 9.847312
9 (t9) 1.588805 6.198219 9.847761
10 (t10) 1.588518 6.204240 9.855544
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Figure 47: Expected evolution of the cumulative duty of Breaker 185.
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7.6.3.3 Evolution of the Interrupting Capability and Breaker Time-to-Failure
The expected evolution of the interrupting capability thresholds I0 and I1 from Equa-
tions (25) and (26) is plotted in Figure 48. Both the discrete-time variation and the
interpolation of the discrete data on a weekly basis are plotted in the figure. The
interpolation of these variables is used in the rest of the computations.
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Figure 48: Expected evolution of the interrupting capability (failure thresholds) of
Breaker 185.
As with the failure thresholds, the stress-induced probabilities of breaker failure
also vary with time. The time horizon is discretized to a weekly scale as before,
and the stress-induced probability of breaker failure is computed for each week using
Equation (17). The expected variation of this probability is shown in Figure 49a. The
stress-induced failure rate can be easily derived using Equation (18). Since PStress(t)
is much smaller than 1, PStress(t) and λStress(t) have almost identical values.
The variation of the breaker MTTF from the contribution of fault stresses alone
is then computed using Equation (39) and shown in Figure 49b. One can observe
from Figure 49b that, when taken alone, the generation capacity growth scenario
contributes to a reduction of the expected breaker lifetime by half. The importance
of this impact is to be weighted with other general breaker reliability data.
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Figure 49: Evolution of (a) the probability of failure (one-year window) and (b) the
MTTF of a breaker (relative scale).
The time horizon selected in this example is too short to provide enough stress
information to predict the lifetime PDF of the breaker. The computation of such
an estimate requires an extrapolation of the failure rates beyond the 10-year horizon
described. In such extrapolations, failure rates may be inflated or deflated at the
discretion of the utility or system operator. The failure rate function of this example
can be approximated as
λStress(t) = λStress(0) + rt, (43)
with t expressed in weeks from the present time.
In this example, using λStress(0) = 0.0004503416 (starting value of the computed
failure rates) and r = 3 × 10−7/week provides a trend that is comparable to the
predicted values for λStress(t) (Figure 50). From this simplified expression of the
stresses, and using Equation (39), the breaker lifetime PDF is
fMTTF (t) = (λStress(0) + rt) e
−(λStress(0)t+rt2/2). (44)
The lifetime PDF is also plotted in Figure 50. From here, the mean time-to-failure
of the breaker is determined by taking the weighted average of the times with the
values of the lifetime PDF. In this example, the MTTF of the breaker (from stresses
only) is 1305 weeks or 25 years. For comparison, without the generation capacity
increase, the expected MTTF would have been 2220 weeks under the conditions of
this example and without considering aging factors.
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Figure 50: Example of extrapolated failure rates and circuit breaker lifetime PDF
from the sole contribution of stresses.
7.7 Operation of Circuit Breakers in Sequence
In this section, the proposed algorithm to select which breakers to open is illustrated
using one of the substations of the proposed test system. To simplify the illustration
of the concepts introduced in earlier chapters, fault currents through each breaker
of the substation are compared to the rating of that breaker. The same procedure
can be completed using the low and high failure thresholds I0 and I1 introduced in
Chapter 5.
7.7.1 Situation Overview
The focused substation in this example is Substation 230 with a fault between Phase
A and the neutral on a bus inside the substation. A line between Substations 230
and 200 connects at this bus, and it is therefore faulted. The location of the fault
and the RMS currents on Phase A drawn by the fault through each breaker of the
substation and through connecting breakers at neighboring substations are shown in
Figure 52. The identifying number and rating of each breaker is also shown in the
figure for reference.
It is assumed that the relays can point to the exact fault location. To clear this
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fault while affecting the smallest area possible, Breakers 185 and 186 at Substation
230 and Breakers 158 and 159 at Substation 200 must operate.
7.7.2 Disadvantages of Basic Protection Schemes
Triggering Breakers 185 and 186 is not possible in the situation of this example
because these two breakers are overstressed. These two breakers would fail if operated
under the indicated fault currents. The same remarks also apply to Breakers 183
and 187. Overstress originates from the two connections to generating substations,
through Breakers 195 and 196 that have been added without consideration of circuit
breaker duty requirements.
Note that Breakers 195 and 196 are properly rated and can open on the fault
currents indicated in the figure. In this example, this advantage can be leveraged to
create temporary configurations that allow other breakers to switch and that other-
wise would fail to clear faults.
To clear this fault while keeping overstressed breakers closed, the following break-
ers should be operated: 184, 187, 195, 89, 91, 97, 98, 158, 159, and 160.
Triggering all of these breakers may not be an acceptable practice to clear a single
fault. First, power is removed from all transmission lines at Substation 230 but one.
Basically, Substation 230 is almost isolated. The loss of power on these lines may
affect neighboring substations and distribution systems as well. Worse, there is excess
power produced by the three generators and the generating plant connected through
Breaker 196; that surplus power is not balanced with a sufficient demand.
7.7.3 Temporary Substation Configurations and Switching Sequences
Based on the switching sequence algorithm proposed in Chapter 6, Breakers 195 and
196 should be open first because they do not belong to a ring. Fault analyses after
opening these two breakers one after the other do not result in any of these breakers
being overdutied. It remains necessary to open both Breakers 195 and 196 to reduce
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the duty of Breakers 185 and 186. If Breaker 195 (respectively 196) opens first,
• Breaker 185 must interrupt 17.6 kA (resp. 14.8 kA) but is rated for 14 kA.
• Breaker 186 must interrupt 28.3 kA (resp. 31.1 kA) but is rated for 16 kA.
Breakers 185 and 186 that are primary breakers for the spcified fault do not appear
overdutied after the operation of Breakers 195 and 196. The fault current levels in
this new configuration are similar to those before the addition of the new generating
plants through Breakers 195 and 196. The fault currents through the rest of the
breakers are shown in Table 17.
Breaker switching sequences must still be considered at this point because prac-
tically, breakers never open simultaneously. In contrast, as soon as one breaker in
the ring of Substation 230 opens, the ring is broken, and some breakers may become
overdutied again as a result of opening the first breaker. This point is illustrated in
Figure 51 where the Phase A current through the breaker that remains closed jumps
as the first breaker operates. There is clearly a partial transfer of fault duty as one
breaker operates and opens the ring. In particular,
• if Breaker 186 opens first, Breaker 185 is overdutied with a duty of 25.5 kA.
• if Breaker 185 opens first, Breaker 186 is overdutied with a duty of 25.6 kA.
The point brought by the result above is that opening one of the Breakers 185 or 186
(primary breakers) after operating Breakers 195 and 196 results in the other primary
breaker being overstressed. If a primary breaker operates, the other primary breaker
cannot operate immediately after without failing and activating backup protection.
As a result, the substation as a whole is considered before operating any breaker
beyond Breakers 195 and 196, and a switching sequence must be considered to avoid
breaker failures.
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Figure 51: Plot illustrating the transfer of fault currents during a switching sequence,
with (a) Breaker 186 opening first and (b) Breaker 185 opening first.
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Table 17: Duties of circuit breakers at different switching stages at Substation 230.
Scenarios involving overstressed breakers are highlighted.
ID Breakers → 183 184 185 186 187 191 192
(kA rating) (16) (20) (14) (16) (20) (10) (10)
↓ Switching
sequences
1 All closed 18.79 17.57 20.41 45.22 23.88 9.44 3.114
2 195 16.00 14.76 17.64 28.25 26.96 6.68 1.00
3 196 13.14 11.89 14.79 31.13 9.86 3.75 2.76
4 195, 196 10.12 8.83 11.84 13.81 12.48 1.01 5.40
5 195, 196, 183 open 1.34 1.76 23.93 22.60 9.23 15.51
6 195, 196, 184 1.34 open 3.10 22.64 21.31 7.93 14.22
7 195, 196, 185 1.76 3.10 open 25.64 24.31 10.97 17.24
8 195, 196, 186 23.93 22.64 25.64 open 1.33 14.73 8.44
9 195, 196, 187 22.60 21.31 24.31 1.33 open 13.40 7.11
10 195, 196, 191 9.23 7.93 10.97 14.73 13.40 open 6.29
11 195, 196, 192 15.51 14.22 17.24 8.44 7.11 6.29 open
12 195, 196, 191, 185 0.17 0.36 open 14.68 13.38 open 6.26
13 195, 196, 191, 186 9.16 7.88 10.85 open 2.73 open 1.2
14 Fault cleared 0.66 1.24 open open 0.90 0.87 0.66
Breakers 185 and 186 belong to the same loop comprised of Breakers 183, 184, 185,
186, 187, 191, and 192. It is clear from Table 17 that breaking the ring by opening
the primary breakers, Breaker 185 or 186, or their immediate neighbors makes either
Breaker 185 or 186 overstressed. Trying to reduce fault currents on Breaker 185 or 186
alone makes the fault clearing process complicated by involving most of the breakers
of Substation 230 and neighboring substations.
The only possibility of breaking the ring without overdutying Breakers 185 and
186 in this case is to open Breaker 191, as shown in Cases 12 and 13 of Table 17.
By opening Breaker 191, fault currents from the generators are divided more evenly
between Breakers 185 and 186 than in other scenarios. Also, Breakers 185 and 186
can be both open, regardless of order, after operating Breaker 191. Breakers 158 and
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159 are open last to completely isolate the fault.
A summary of the switching sequence is depicted graphically in Figures 52, 53, 54,
and 55.
A quasistatic simulation of RMS currents (evolution of RMS values with time)
through Breakers 185, 186, and 191 during the switching sequence is also completed
to confirm the intended transfers of breaker fault currents. The Phase A breaker
currents are shown in Figure 56. (The system is rescaled when converted from a load
flow to a quasistatic model. As a result, the computed currents in the power flow
fault analysis and in the quasistatic analysis are different.)
If the considered fault occurs frequently, the substation ring may be opened per-
manently, and Breaker 191 can be left open to avoid repeated switching of substation
configurations. By breaking the ring, fault currents through Breakers 185 and 186
are kept under control. The risk of this approach is an outage of the entire substation
if the breakers that remain closed fail for any reason.
7.8 Remedial Actions on Generator Dispatch
As mentioned in Section 6.4, adjustments to the economic dispatch are best applied
to new generating plants connected to the network because the output of these plants
increases gradually to follow the growth of the system.
Substations 230-A and 230-C are immediate neighbors of Substation 230. Adjust-
ments to how many generators are connected in either Substation 230-A or 230-C
affects fault currents through the breakers of Substation 230. For reference, genera-
tors in Substations 230-A and 230-C are numbered G1, G2, G3, and G4 (Figure 43).
Generator G1 is required to be operational because it is the PV generator in each
of these two substations. In Substation 230, which is also a generator substation,
disconnecting one or more generators affects fault currents through the breakers of
the substation.
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Figure 52: Fault currents compared to breaker ratings at Substation 230 and neigh-
boring substations.
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Figure 53: Circuit breaker fault currents after opening Breakers 195 and 196 at
Substation 230.
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Figure 54: Circuit breaker fault currents after opening Breakers 195, 196, and 191
at Substation 230.
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Figure 55: Circuit breaker currents after clearing the fault at Substation 230.
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Figure 56: Quasistatic plots of circuit breaker currents during the switching se-
quence.
In Section 7.7, it is established that removing the connection to Substations 230-
A and 230-C, i.e. opening Breakers 195 and 196 reduces fault currents through the
breakers throughout the entire substation.
The studied fault is the same as the example in the previous section, i.e. a
fault between Breakers 185 and 186. All breakers in Substation 230 are open. An
additional constraint is added: generator G1 must be connected in Substations 230-A
and 230-C for PV control. In other words, at least one generator must be active at
Substations 230-A and 230-C. The economic dispatch for Substations 230, 230-A, and
230-C addresses two issues:
• Is it possible to operate the generators at these substations without overdutying
circuit breakers for the specified fault?
• If all loads were to be served, what would be the failure rates of the circuit
breakers?
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Table 18: Duties of circuit breakers at Substation 230 for different generator com-
mitments. Scenarios involving overstressed breakers are highlighted.
ID Breakers → 183 184 185 186 187 191 192
(kA rating) (16) (20) (14) (16) (20) (10) (10)
↓ Generator
constraints
1 Initial case
(+1240 MW)
18.79 17.57 20.41 45.22 23.88 9.44 3.11
2 Sub. 230-A with G1
only (+775 MW)
15.72 14.46 17.42 37.81 16.52 6.58 1.17
3 Sub. 230-A and
230-C with G1 only
(+310 MW)
11.76 10.41 13.61 21.05 14.75 3.13 3.24
4 Same as above +
Sub. 230 with G2 re-
moved (+155 MW)
9.26 7.89 11.15 17.78 11.45 1.17 1.11
5 Same as above +
Sub. 230 with G1 re-
moved (+0 MW)
5.31 3.96 7.24 14.81 8.46 3.58 3.34
Different scenarios are tested and the results are summarized in Table 18. In
parentheses are indicated the difference between and the connected capacity before
the addition of substations 230-A and 230-C. These scenarios are also illustrated in
points (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 57.
In terms of operating breakers within their ratings, reducing the generating capac-
ity to its level before the addition of Substations 230-A and 230-C reduces the duty
on primary breakers for the specified fault at Substation 230, similarly to Case 4 in
Table 17. Relocation of generation sources has a minor effect on fault currents as the
results from Table 18 and Table 17 differ slightly. With fault currents through circuit
breakers reduced, a switching sequence can be found to clear the specified fault and
preserve breaker adequacy.
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Fault
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Fault
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Figure 57: Circuit breaker currents at each stage of the generator dispatch adjust-
ment.
148
In terms of serving all load, assuming loads have grown by less than 155 MW from
the commissioning of generators, Case 4 in Table 18 is equivalent to an addition of
155 MW to the capacity to before the commissioning of Substations 230-A and 230-
C. From the fault analysis on this case, only one breaker (Breaker 186) is overdutied
after applying the generator disptch solution. A proper switching sequence (or other
actions) must be found to clear the fault between Breakers 185 and 186 without
breaker failures.
7.9 Integrating Current Limiting Devices
In Figure 58, a fault current limiter is inserted in series with Breaker 186 to reduce
the fault duty of that breaker. The equivalent, positive sequence circuit of the current
limiter is shown in Figure 59.
I II I
SUBSTATION
183 (16 kA) 185 (14 kA) 186 (16 kA)
187 (20 kA)
192 (10 kA)191 (10 kA)
184 (20 kA)
G1 G2 G3
Current limiter
Fault current
limiter
switch
Fault
I
I
SUBSTATION 200
SUBSTATION 130
SUBSTATION 120
89 (6 kA) 91 (8 kA) 158 (10 kA) 159 (8 kA) 160 (6 kA)
98 (8 kA) 97 (10 kA)
230
Figure 58: Diagram of Substation 230 with current limiting device in series with
Breaker 186.
Three Phase Equivalent Circuit C lose
Positive Sequence
Negative Sequence
Zero Sequence
0.1418 % 5.000 %
0.3333 %0.00 % 0.3333 % 0.00 %
0.001418 % 0.02571 %
0.3333 %0.00 % 0.3333 % 0.00 %
0.01875 % 0.09094 %
0.1984 %0.00 % 0.1984 % 0.00 %
B230-FCL
230.0 kV
B230-202
230.0 kV
Series elements are resistances and reactances
Shunt elements are conductances and susceptances
WinIGS-Q - Form: IGS_M108_D - Copyright © A. P. Meliopoulos 1998-2008
Figure 59: Positive sequence circuit of the current limiter from Figure 58.
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As in the switching sequence previously described, a single-line-to-neutral fault is
applied between Breakers 185 and 186. As in the switching sequence example, fault
currents through Breakers 185 and 186 are initially reduced by opening Breakers
195 and 196. To clear the fault, Breaker 185 is opened first. Breaker 186 receives
the portion of the fault current that was flowing through Breaker 185 and becomes
overstressed. To further reduce the duty through Breaker 186, a fault current limiter
is activated. Fault clearance is completed when currents through Breaker 186 fall
below the rating of the breaker and Breaker 186 operates. The evolution of breaker
currents are plotted in Figure 60.
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Figure 60: Quasistatic plot illustrating the effect of a current limiting device on
breaker RMS currents.
Current limiters are effective at bringing fault currents to levels that are much
lower than the ratings of the breakers. Their use is still not widespread because of
the insufficient maturity and the relatively high cost of current limiters. Nonetheless,
overstressed breakers directly benefit from fault current limiters in terms of avoided
failures.
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7.10 Directions for Future Developments
7.10.1 Real-Time, Accurate Model of Breaker Fault Duty
In an electrical network, circuit breaker stresses change each time the topology of the
network is modified. The simulation software used, WinIGS, performs fault analysis
for one breaker at a time, for a given topology, and for a specific type of faults. Should
the topology of a substation change, the fault duty analysis must be completed again
for each breaker of the network using the new topology.
Optimizing substation connectivity to prevent breaker failures requires the exam-
ination of numerous possible connectivity schemes. One of the first tasks for future
work is to create an algorithm that recomputes the duty of every breaker for the con-
sidered connectivity schemes. The WinIGS software can be automated by launching
several simulations one after the other for each breaker, with all fault types associated
with the appropriate likelihood.
Besides simulation automation, the precision and meaning of the reliability quan-
tities produced, such as PStress, must be matched with field observations. Field data
are usually available from utilities. On the data precision aspect, the figures for prob-
abilities may vary depending on the resolution selected to compute the fault currents
density functions. To avoid discrepancies, the reliability data must be computed and
compared on the same fault current resolution.
7.10.2 Presentation of Circuit Breaker Data as a Control Center Appli-
cation
Stress-induced breaker failures and other breaker reliability data can be graphically
rendered to provide with a quick but comprehensive view of the conditions of all
circuit breakers in a power system to system operators. A conceptual example of
such a color-sensitive display is shown in Figure 61. The display has the following
characteristics:
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• Use of a breaker-oriented network diagram;
• Flattened network diagram to have all substation layouts available in the same
display; and
• Breaker data are drawn as bars shown at the location of the breakers.
Colors may be used to distinguish breaker duty status. In Figure 61, green bars indi-
cate acceptable failure rates, and overflowing red bars indicate failure rates exceeding
an acceptable value (set at 10−4 in this example). The network diagram in the back-
ground is the 24-bus system diagram with all substation breakers as it appears in the
1996 definition of the IEEE Reliability Test System.
If working at the substation level rather than the system level, the display de-
scribed above can be limited to a particular substation or a specific path within a
substation.
Circuit breaker reliability data monitoring applies not only to individual breakers
within substations, but also to all the possible paths that connect any two points
within the substation. At the substation level, the display of circuit breaker reliability
data (Figure 62) can be applied to the selection of the most reliable substation paths
to connect two lines together (Figure 63). A simple path enumeration algorithm
is utilized that converts a graph between two substation nodes into a list of paths
between these two nodes. As an example, the stress-induced failure probabilities of a
path is computed using
PStress,Path = 1−
∏
k∈Path
(1− PStress,k),
where k denotes the index of each breaker within the selected path.
Of course, as a control center application, all breaker data (including reliability
data) are concentrated in one database that allows retrieving and comparing specific
quantities side by side for all the breakers in the system (Figure 64).
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Substation selector
Path 
origin/destination 
nodes with display 
of the number of 
paths available for 
each pair of nodes
Path reliability
visualizer
Path selector
List of breakers 
(links to breaker 
information)
Figure 62: Example visualization of breaker reliability data for a substation path.
Path ID Remarks
1 0.99982941  170 to 211 via 170_A1, N_A1, N_211, 
2 0.99930819  170 to 211 via 170_A1, N_A1, N_H, H_Z, 212_Z, 211_212, 
3 0.99966069  170 to 211 via 170_Z, 212_Z, 211_212, 
4 0.99950571  170 to 211 via 170_Z, H_Z, N_H, N_211, 
5 0.99974417  170 to 212 via 170_A1, N_A1, N_211, 211_212, 
6 0.99939339  170 to 212 via 170_A1, N_A1, N_H, H_Z, 212_Z, 
7 0.99974592  170 to 212 via 170_Z, 212_Z, 
8 0.99942050  170 to 212 via 170_Z, H_Z, N_H, N_211, 211_212, 
9 0.99996225  170 to A1 via 170_A1, 
10 0.99952790  170 to A1 via 170_Z, 212_Z, 211_212, N_211, N_A1, 
11 0.99951419  170 to A1 via 170_Z, H_Z, N_H, N_A1, 
12 0.99942342  170 to H via 170_A1, N_A1, N_211, 211_212, 212_Z, H_Z, 
13 0.99971413  170 to H via 170_A1, N_A1, N_H, 
Probability of
Non-failure
Figure 63: Example report of substation path reliability calculations.
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Figure 64: Tabular display of circuit breaker reliability data.
The tools and displays described can be integrated into a single control center
software focused on circuit breaker adequacy analysis. The prospective software uses
a real-time model of power systems. Every time the topology of the controlled net-
work changes for continued operation (as opposed to transient response), the fault
and reliability data for the appropriate breakers are recomputed using the procedure
described in this study. Protection schemes that account for circuit breaker adequacy
can be designed and tested offline using the available circuit breaker data. Should a
fault cause currents to exceed the ratings of a breaker, protection schemes with fo-
cus on breaker adequacy can help avoid breaker failures and extended common-mode
outages.
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7.10.3 Applications to Power System Reliability Analysis
In the case of a breaker failure, backup protection schemes isolate the fault by opening
breakers surrounding the faulted area. The affected area grows until fault conditions
are cleared, and the response of backup protection systems results in simultaneous,
multiple component outages.
The results of the analysis of circuit breaker failures caused by short-circuit cur-
rents above nameplate rating can serve as inputs to bulk power system reliability
analysis methodologies such as one recently published [41]. The bulk power system
reliability analysis methodology is based on selective enumeration of contingencies.
The common-mode outages resulting from the proposed methodology can be incor-
porated in the reliability analysis as a means to improve the selection or ranking of
the contingencies.
The effects of common-mode outages on the overall system reliability still have to
be determined. The proposed circuit breaker reliability model allows the computation
of better data for reliability assessment methodologies.
7.11 Summary
The numerical examples presented in this chapter present circuit breaker reliability
results from fault analysis using a 24-substation test system derived from the IEEE
Reliability Test System. The modified test system is a three-phase, breaker-oriented,
physical model of a transmission network with explicit modeling of breaker arrange-
ments at all substations. The test system also uses three-phase, physical models of
transmission lines and cables for improved fidelity with existing networks.
A quantification of the factors (system and simulation) that affect the range and
probability density of fault currents is presented. Such factors include the fault types
considered (one, two, and three phases affected) The impact of these factors on the
reliability of the considered circuit breakers must not be neglected.
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The impact of the growth of power systems is also considered using a case where
breaker failure rates are updated as the generation capacity of the test system is
expanded with power plants of different sizes.
Besides, operating strategies are explored using fault conditions involving the
operation of overdutied breakers. Operation of breakers in sequence, adjustments to
generator dispatch, and the use of fault current limiters are short-term solutions to
the breaker overstress problem. Particular attention must be given to the transfer
of fault currents to a single breaker when clearing a fault on a ring bus. Long term
solutions involve the upgrade or replacement of overstressed breakers, or an overhaul
of protection schemes.
Possible immediate applications of breaker adequacy analysis are presented, with
an emphasis on control center applications. In control centers, operators are provided
with displays that convey a picture of the overall condition of the system at a glance.
As an extension of this study, the circuit breaker reliability quantities computed from
breaker fault statistics can be integrated in more comprehensive models to study
common-mode outages and their impact on overall system reliability.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
8.1 Review of Contributions
Power systems grow as the demand for reliable electric power increases. New power
sources such as large plants (e.g. nuclear reactors, natural gas plants, etc.) and
distributed generation (including wind and solar farms, small non-utility generators,
and cogenerating facilities) are gradually added to power systems to meet the growing
demand.
Additions to the generation capacity of a network cause fault currents to increase.
These additions may result in operational unreliability because as fault currents in-
crease, fault currents will eventually exceed circuit breaker ratings. Specifically, cir-
cuit breakers are more likely to fail when fault currents gradually reach and exceed
breaker interrupting capabilities. Meanwhile, power system operations must continue
at acceptable reliability levels.
The contributions of this research are (a) a methodology to quantify breaker fail-
ures caused by increased fault stresses as the generation capacity of power systems
expands and (b) operational strategies that address circuit breaker adequacy issues.
Because the underlying phenomena are dependent on uncertain parameters, proba-
bilistic approaches are employed. The developed methodology and operational strate-
gies are based on four contributed models described below.
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Probability Density Computation of Fault Currents To quantify stress-induced
breaker failures, a methodology that employs a Monte Carlo simulation of fault cur-
rents through the considered breakers and that is based on three-phase, breaker-
oriented, physical models of power networks is proposed [159]. Circuit breaker ar-
rangements are modeled explicitly to allow fault analysis at the circuit breaker level.
A three-phase, breaker-oriented fault analysis procedure is used to determine breaker
fault current statistics [160]. The Monte Carlo simulation itself is based on a known
average number of faults per year on each transmission line of a test system.
Circuit Breaker Reliability Model The probability density functions of fault
currents obtained from the Monte Carlo simulations are combined with interrupting
capability functions that determine, for each considered breaker, the probability of
success or failure of a breaker operation for currents of a given magnitude. The
combination of the probability density of fault current levels and the interrupting
capability function, in conjunction with the expected number of operations of a circuit
breaker during a particular time period, provides the probability of breaker failure as
a result of fault stresses [161, 162, 163].
Prediction of the Evolution of Breaker Failure Data To help estimate the
time-to-failure of a breaker, the stress-induced probability of failure obtained for
that breaker is factored into a Markov chain [164]. The time dimension of circuit
breaker failures is provided by a generation growth model over a given time horizon.
The generation growth scenario is the starting point to predict the evolution of the
breaker time-to-failure over the considered time horizon. Because generation growth
impacts circuit breaker failure rates, periodical updates of circuit breaker reliability
data are highly desirable.
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Substation Reconfiguration and Economic Dispatch Constrained by Breaker
Reliability The computed circuit breaker failure data and operating limits become
constraints for power systems operation and protection. Several strategies to circum-
vent circuit breaker adequacy constraints are explored. Fault current limiters appear
as the least invasive (but most expensive) solution to reduce the duty of overstressed
breakers. Operating substation breakers in sequence carries the benefit of control-
ling the flow of fault currents through all breakers. An algorithm to find such a
sequence with an account for breaker ratings and stresses is proposed. The inclusion
of circuit breaker reliability constraints into the optimal power flow or the economic
dispatch problems tackles the issue of breaker adequacy at its source by restricting
generating capacity and fault currents. With such strategies, system reliability can
be maintained while delaying the need to upgrade breakers until the proper time.
8.2 Directions for Future Work
The two most important perspectives discussed in this section are the calibration and
validation of the proposed model and the deployment of the proposed methodologies
in substations and control centers.
8.2.1 Model Integration and Result Validation
The proposed circuit breaker reliability model is focused on the contributions of fault
currents to the breaker failure rates, independently from the contributions of aging.
Ultimately, the proposed circuit breaker reliability model must include all failure rates
from all breaker failure modes, especially aging and stresses.
The models and illustrative results presented in this thesis must be calibrated
and validated, ideally against utility records, manufacturer designs, and breaker test
results. One area for improvement is the accuracy of the Monte Carlo simulation of
fault currents, where the simulation of different types of faults with different likeli-
hoods on different lines can be automated. In addition, the relative importance of
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age-related failures and stress-related failures must be determined for the different
stages of the life of a circuit breaker. Predictions of the breaker time-to-failure should
also account for trends in generation growth and are best performed with growth sce-
narios that are consistent with the expansion history of existing infrastructure from
different utilities.
8.2.2 Deployment to Substations and Control Centers
The proposed methodologies for economic dispatch and substation reconfiguration
can be developed and implemented as new applications for control centers and sub-
station protection schemes. In particular, updates of the fault current statistics as
the configuration of the studied power system changes provide a global vision of cir-
cuit breaker adequacy issues to the operators and protection systems. As a result,
the methodologies proposed in this study can be deployed at control centers and in
transmission substations to operate power systems in certain configurations and to
allow or prevent the operation of overstressed breakers [165]. A tremendous amount
of information on circuit breakers can be leveraged by combining manufacturer data,
breaker adequacy data and fault history data. Additional information about the
topology of the entire system can be retrieved using the communication networks
between different relays and between relays and the control center.
Substation reconfiguration strategies can be deployed at the substation level. The
data for circuit breaker adequacy can be combined with the fault and interruption his-
tory recorded by the relays to form a comprehensive circuit breaker database. In turn,
relays can benefit from the comprehensive data set and other knowledge of the power
system to implement the substation reconfiguration sequences. Relay coordination
inside substations is achieved using the networking capabilities of computer-based
relays. Although certain substation reconfiguration sequences may be memorized
in advance for certain fault scenarios, the long-term objective is to have substation
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reconfiguration sequences generated in real time (within a few cycles) as faults occur.
At the control center level, two applications of this study can be deployed. First, a
supervising application that oversees the substation reconfiguration process and com-
plements the reconfiguration functionality deployed at individual substations can be
integrated in control rooms. Such an application collects and summarizes the status
of the topology at each substation in the studied system. Second, the application of
circuit breaker adequacy constraints to the economic dispatch problem can be imple-
mented. Generation capacity constraints brought by specific circuit breakers can be
reported at the control center and highlighted to provide a global vision of sensitive
areas to the operators. Therefore, operators can commit generators depending on
desired breaker reliability levels as well as margins between the demand and the total
power installed.
With a comprehensive set of circuit breaker data available, comprehensive control
and protection schemes can be implemented using the breaker reliability methodology
presented in this study. Ultimately, protection schemes and control center applica-
tions will become aware of the constraints imposed by the limitations of circuit breaker
ratings and integrate these constraints into the real-time operation of power systems.
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